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Historic Preservation Law: The Metes &
Bounds of a New Field
NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON*
Historic Preservation Law has come to mean that combina-
tion of regulations, common-law property principles, tax incen-
tives, and adjective law in administrative proceedings, governing
historic sites and property within the United States. Although
Congress first recognized a need to conserve the nation's wealth
of historic amenities in 1906 when it adopted The Antiquities
Act,1 it was only with the nation's bicentennial that the volume
and diversity of laws designed to maintain, protect and preserve
historic America grew to the point where it could be said that a
new field of law had emerged.
The symposium which follows this essay represents the first
attempt to comprehensively delineate the elements of this new
field.2 The conference entitled "Historic Preservation and the
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Metes and Bounds of a New Field" (September 22-23, 1978), the edited proceedings of
which comprise this Symposium; Mendes Hershman, Esq., and Whitney North Seymour,
Esq., served as co-chairmen with Professor Robinson at the Conference. The Conference
was sponsored by the New York Landmarks Conservancy, in cooperation with the Mu-
nicipai Arts Society, National Trust for Historic Preservation, New York City
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tion. Thanks are due to Professor Robinson's research assistant Pamela V. Rubin, and
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symposium for publication.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1976). This Act was preceded by the federal acquisition of
the Gettysburg Battlefield in 1890, see United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S.
668 (1896).
2. An earlier important symposium at Duke Law School had reviewed the law for
landmark protection in a conference whose papers appeared in 36 LAw & CoNTmMP.
PRoas. 311 (1971). At the time of that conference, there was not yet a perception that
"Preservation Law" could stand by itself. Indeed, Professor Robert Stipe's often re-
peated statement published in that 1971 symposium tended to concede that Preservation
Law was not its own field: "Historic conservation is but one aspect of the much larger
1
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Law: The Metes & Bounds of a New Field" gathered 500 per-
sons for two days at the House of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York in September of 1978. s Organized by the
Association and the New York Landmarks Conservancy, this
conference traversed the entire range of preservation legal is-
sues, from asking "what is historic?" to identifying the need for
law reform already apparent in this new field. The proceedings
of this conference comprise this symposium.
Identifying a coherent body of law governing historic values,
however, does not mean that the field is mature or even widely
recognized as having been established. The general dimensions
of the field are, perhaps, evident, but the content or the sub-
stance within the field is changing dramatically. As the Tenth
Annual Report of the Federal Council on Environmental Quality
observed in 1979: "One man's cultural landscape is often an-
other's rundown row house.' 4 Since the presentation of these
symposium papers in 1978, the evolution of the field has been
chronicled in continuing legal education course books on "His-
toric Preservation Law."'
Before 1978, the historic preservation field had been synthe-
sized in part in a handful of essays.' The nation's bicentennial in
1976 inspired publication of two law review symposia on the law
problem, basically an environmental one, of enhancing-or perhaps developing for the
first time-the quality of life for people." (quoted by Mr. Justice Brennan in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 n. 4 (1978), citing Gilbert, Introduction,
Precedents for the Future, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoSs. 311, 312 (1971), quoting Address
by Robert Stipe, CONFERENCE ON PRESERVATION LAW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 6, 7 (May 1,
1971) (unpublished text).
3. Robinson, Environmental Law, Report of Conference on Historic Preservation,
N.Y.L.J. 1, Oct. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
4. 1979 ENVT'L QuALiTY 512.
5. HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (N.A. Robinson ed., PLI, 1979) and HISTORIC PRES-
ERVATION LAW 1980 (N.A. Robinson ed., PLI, 1980); see also the annual coursebooks for
1979, 1980 and 1981 for the Environmental Law Course of study of the American Bar
Association - American Law Institute Committee on Continuing Professional Education,
given in Washington, D.C., in cooperation with the Smithsonian Institute and the Envi-
ronmental Law Institute.
6. John Fowler, Protection of the Cultural Environment in Federal Law, in FED-
ERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1466, 1468-73 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); updated
in Fowler, FEDERAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW: NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT,
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11593, AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTs IN FEDERAL LAW, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 31 (1976); see Bibliography to Legal Periodicals Dealing with Historic
Preservation and Aesthetic Regulation, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 275 (1976).
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of historic preservation, and another law review symposium was
published shortly thereafter in honor of Professor Robert Stipe5
The consensus about what should exist within the bounds of
historic preservation law is still taking form.' Since it is still an
immature field, the body of historic preservation law will evolve
substantially in the near future.
By way of introduction, this essay provides background and
a conceptual framework for the presentations which follow. This
essay can best introduce the symposium by delineating first the
scope of regulation by exercise of the police power and the defi-
nitions for what resources are "historic," then the elements of
real property law which transect these regulations, and thereaf-
ter the operation of municipal ordinances and federal procedural
statutes which are the body of historic preservation law. The es-
say will then raise several of the thorny issues currently in dis-
pute within this evolving field.
I. Evolution of Historic Preservation Regulatory Controls
A. Legislative History
While isolated examples of historic preservation laws can be
traced to the 19th century,10 the widespread contemporary use
of these regulations dates only from the late 1960s. By the time
of the United States Supreme Court's "landmark" ruling in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City in 1978,
the role of municipal government in regulating landmarks and
historic districts had become well established. With enactment
7. 8 CONN. L. REV. 199 (1976) and Historic Preservation Symposium, 12 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 1 (1976).
8. Historic Preservation Symposium, 11 N.C. CrNrr. L.J. 195 (1980).
9. At the state level, the perception also began to emerge that in each state there
was a body of state historic preservation law. The fact that most states had enacted such
laws was established by Morrison's study in 1965. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION
LAW (1965). A decade later, specific state guides and evaluations had emerged for Cali-
fornia, see G. GAMMAGE, P. JONES & S. JONES, HISTOIC PRESERVATION IN CALIFORNIA: A
LEGAL HANDBOOK (Stanford Environmental Law Society; National Trust for Historic
Preservation, 1975) Virginia, see HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN VIRGINIA
(R. Collins, R. Netherton & R. Pisney eds. 1978), and New York, see N.A. Robinson,
Municipal Ordinances for Historic Preservation in New York State, 53 N.Y.S. B.J. 18
(1981).
10. See generally MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW, supra note 9.
11. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,12 and
the National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980,13
the federal government had established strong patterns of in-
volvement in the protection of archaeological and historically
important sites.
New York State set the precedent for state governmental
action for historic preservation in 1850 by acquiring Hansbrouck
House, General Washington's headquarters in Newburgh;"4 the
federal government designated its first landmark in 1889.11 The
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional propri-
ety of the government's power to preserve landmarks by acquisi-
tion in 1896.16 In 1906, the Antiquities Act authorized the Presi-
dent to establish monuments on government lands.17 The City of
New Orleans adopted its Vieux Carrg Ordinance in 193716 to
preserve the "quaint and distinctive character" of the Vieux
Carr section of the City; permits were required for any changes
to buildings in the regulated section of the city. The New Orle-
ans efforts and the historic preservation zoning laws of Charles-
ton, S.C., represented the nation's only substantial local govern-
ment action until after. the Second World War.19
While European authorities undertook to inventory their
historic properties in registries and to adopt strict preservation
laws in the first half of the twentieth century, 0 the governments
in the United States did little inventorying until after World
12. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa-47011 (Supp. III 1979).
13. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470-470w-6 (West Pam. 1981) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
14. See Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of Historic
Property, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 708 (1963).
15. Casa Grande National Monument, Gila Valley, Arizona (a four-story tower of
packed earth built by Hohokam Indians over six centuries ago).
16. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). (The Gettysburg
Battlefield Acquisition).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433.
18. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carr6 Ordinance no. 14538 CCS sec. 3 (1937); adopted
pursuant to LA. CONsT. art. 14, § 22A.
19. See Note, supra note 14, at 713-14.
20. See, e.g., The U.K. Ancient Monuments Acts, 1931, 218-22 Geo. 5, ch. 16; The
U.K. Ancient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act, 1913, 384 Geo. 5, ch. 32;
see also N.A. ROBINsoN, Environmental Laws and Conventions: Toward Societal Com-
pacts With Nature, EARTMCARE: GLOBAL PROTECTION OF NATURAL AREAs 513, 520-21
(Schofield ed. 1979).
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War II. Skilled manpower available in the Depression Years of
the 1930s did produce the Historic American Buildings Survey
which nationally catalogued some 12,000 buildings by 1933,11
and Congress did enact an Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiq-
uities Act of 1935.2 At the time, however, these activities and
laws had little effect on the actual status of protection of historic
properties.
With each ensuing decade, the pace of urban change quick-
ened, and one building after another was replaced. By the 1970s,
along with the Metropolitan Opera House and Pennsylvania
Station, over fifty percent of all buildings recorded in the His-
toric American Buildings Survey of 1933 had been demolished.2 3
In the face of such rapid razing of historical buildings and areas,
Congress established the National Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion in 1949 to encourage state and local preservation."
The use of specialized local legislation to assure historic
preservation has been spreading to communities across the na-
tion. 5 To such local laws have been added some federal enact-
ments, many of them being procedural rather than substantive,
to assure that officials consider historic values in their decisions.
Chief among these are the Historic Preservation Act of 1966,'
the historic protection sections of the Housing Acts of 1961 and
1965,' 7 and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966.18
In one way or another these federal laws advanced historic
preservation as a governmental priority. The 1966 Historic Pres-
ervation Act authorized creation of the National Register of
Historic Places, containing landmarks nominated by state gov-
ernments, provided for grants in aid and required that the
21. See Documenting A Legacy (1973), reproduced from Quarterly Journal of the
Library of Congress (Oct. 1973).
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), amended by 16 U.S.C.A. § 467(b)
(West Supp. 1980).
23. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1972).
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 468-468e (1976).
25. See 1 ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8.46-8.53 (2d ed.
1973).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470-
470w-6 (West Pam. 1981).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1500d-1 (1976).
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651(b)(2), 1653(f) (1976).
19811
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
agency involved in any federal action affecting a registered
landmark "take into account the effect" of the action and "af-
ford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation .. .a rea-
sonable opportunity to comment" on such effect.2 More forceful
was the Transportation Act, which mandated in section 4(f) that
no historic site could be used unless there were "no feasible and
prudent alternative" and "all possible planning to minimize
harm" was undertaken.30 The section has been construed to bar
resort to historic sites for highway use."1
The Housing Acts do not specify the same sort of prohibi-
tive bars as does the highway legislation. The 1966 Demonstra-
tion Cities and Metropolitan Development Act provided funds
for local surveys of historic sites.32 Grants for urban beautifica-
tion and open space were also provided. The Department of
Housing and Urban Development has been criticized for func-
tioning often "with apparent indifference to the destruction of
historic sites, even National Register properties, whenever local
development authorities [were] prepared to sacrifice those
properties in the interests of urban renewal or other housing
programs.""3
Essentially, historic preservation can expect little except
financial aid and self-restraint from federal administrative
sources. The federal laws are largely procedural. Commitment
and action necessarily occur at the state and local levels; it is
here that substantive controls are enacted. 4
29. 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
30. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f).
31. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
33. 0. GRAY, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preservation, in LE-
GAL TECHNIQUES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 7 (1972).
34. It is worth noting, parenthetically, that this weak federal law framework falls
below the legal standards recommended for protecting national historic sites in 1972 by
UNESCO; these standards are based largely on stricter European laws. Recommendation
Concerning the Protection, At the National Level of General Conference of the United
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (17th Sess. 1972). Protection
laws or regulations should be supplemented with provisions "to promote the conserva-
tion of the cultural and natural heritage." No building should be erected or changed or
demolished without permit and planning. New developments should respect historic des-
ignation. Protection should be uniform, regardless of whether the property is in private
or public hands. Penalties and administrative sanctions should be provided for those
who do not protect such heritage.
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More substantive federal and statewide laws may be devel-
oped if the loss of historic sites continue to grow. The legal ra-
tionale for enacting stiffer historic preservation laws at the local
and state levels is evident. As Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in
Berman v. Parker,3 5 an early urban renewal case:
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to de-
termine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled."
B. Evolving Rationales and Judicial Acceptance
Economic benefits are often conferred by historic preserva-
tion programs; unlike many regulatory restrictions on private
property, property under historic controls can appreciate in
market value, thereby either greatly altering or eliminating "tak-
ing" or due process considerations. Property values in preserved
areas often are enhanced markedly.3 7 Furthermore, sophisticated
land use controls can be used to create new economic value in
property in order to regulate urban development and preserve
historic and other assets. The incentive zoning in New York
City's Zoning Resolution illustrates this sort of innovation.3 8 The
"Special Madison Avenue Preservation District" enacted in 1973
is a good example;39 so also is the provision for transfer of devel-
opment rights to air space.40 Condominium ownership of row
houses can be a viable private ownership means to honor public
preservation and secure tax and other legal benefits.4 '
35. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
36. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 33. See Note, Land Use Controls in Historic
Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379, 383-88 (1969). See also Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y. 2d
263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y. 2d 462, 468, 191
N.E.2d 272, 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 738 (1963); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
37. Note, supra note 36 at 387.
38. See Costonis, supra note 23, at 576-79.
39. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING REs. art. 9, ch. 9 (1981).
40. See Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 Yale
L.J. 75 (1973).
41. Note, supra note 36, at 404-05. In Rome, N.Y., the local government secured
state approval for and created an Historical Authority with power to issue bonds to pre-
serve the historic value of the community. See N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1900-1920 (Mc-
1981]
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While some of these innovative land use and historic preser-
vation techniques are untested in the courts, it is likely that
they can withstand attacks grounded in due process or taking
arguments. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
Berman v. Parker: "If those who govern the District of Colum-
bia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.''42
Court challenges to local landmarks preservation laws ini-
tially were frequent, despite the dicta from the Court in Berman
v. Parker. For example, in Ithaca,43 the Landmark Commission
designated a building owned by Tompkins County as a
landmark. It is surrounded by an historic district. The county
sought to demolish the building and sued to invalidate the ordi-
nance. New York City's law has also withstood several attacks,44
including the challenge to designation of Grand Central Station
as a landmark;4 5 the latter assault was litigated through the
United States Supreme Court, settling the constitutionality of
historic preservation laws as such.'
Kinney 1981). The objective was to restore the Erie Canal and develop a tourist center as
well as advanced aesthetic and educational assets.
42. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 33.
43. Tompkins County v. Ithaca, 77 Misc. 2d 882, 355 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct.
Tompkins County 1974). This case parallels Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel
County, 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974).
44. See, e.g., Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968); see also Ragone v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1970, at 2, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County), alI'd, 33 A.D.2d 1105,
308 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1970); Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n,
51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
45. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). New York City's
experience serves as a good case study of historic preservation by a local government.
See Loflin, Rankin, Marcus, & Goldstone, Historic Preservation in the American City: A
New York Case Study, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 362-85 (1971). See also the Commis-
sion's documents and procedures in D. Miner, Case Study: Administrative Procedures of
New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission in HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW
1980, supra note 5, at 43. The Landmark Preservation Commission's members are ap-
pointed by the Mayor and must include at least three architects, an historian, a city
planner, a realtor and one resident from each borough.
Any site, building or other structure or area of the City with special character can be
designated as a landmark by the Commission. Areas with numerous buildings of the
same historic value can be designated as historic districts. The Board of Estimate must
[Vol. 1:511
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The sort of regulatory scheme provided in local landmarks
preservation laws is an administrative law alternative to civil
suits grounded in aesthetic nuisance theories. 47 While private
suits are a costly and imprecise tool, the landmark designation
process is not. Landmark commission deliberations permit a
more sophisticated balancing of interests within a mandate to
preserve the historic built environment. Where a legislative con-
sensus exists to protect historic sites, the landmarks process
proves to be an effective way to identify specific sites worth sav-
ing, and in turn to conserve them. Suffice it to say that the New
York City experience has been repeated, mutatis mutandis, in
smaller communities across New York 8 and in other states.4
The recurring motivation for such local laws, and at the
same time an insight to their limitations, is provided by John
Pyke, counsel in the Hanna Mining Company's Legal Depart-
ment, when he characteristically described the need to preserve
one historic site:
A poignant example is the riverbank site in Cleveland, Ohio,
where the founder of that City first stepped ashore in 1796 after a
Lake Erie voyage. Today its historic symbolism is lost in the
shadow of a towering bridge that arches above it, while the pol-
approve all designations. Staff reports are prepared on all proposed landmarks, where
upon a public hearing is he!d and the Commission prepares a report and acts.
As of February 16, 1982, New York City has designated 42 Historic Districts con-
taining approximately 17,000 buildings, 662 individual landmarks, 8 scenic landmarks,
and 27 interior landmarks. Figures provided by Dorothy Miner, General Counsel to New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission. Interiors to buildings and parks can be
designated for landmark protection as well. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A §
207-2.0 (Williams 1976 & Supp. 1981).
Any alteration to a designated landmark requires an application to the Commission.
Alteration includes repairs or modernization. Public hearings are provided when the
Commission deliberates whether the proposed act is in keeping with the historic values
of the landmark. Id. §§ 207-4.0, 207-6.0. In practice, informal consultations on changes
are encouraged so that, through conferences, a course of action is achieved between the
applicant and Commission staff.
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law includes enforcement provisions and
criminal sanctions for altering or demolishing a landmark without permission of the
Commission. Fines and imprisonment are provided for as ultimate sanctions. Id. § 207-
16.0.
47. Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1075 (1970); Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1939).
48. See, e.g., TARRYTOWN, N.Y., [1978] LOCAL LAW 3.
49. See, e.g., TOWN OF CRESTED BuTTE, COLORADO, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND AR-
CHITECTURAL CONTROL-HISTORIc DISTRICT, TOWN CODE ch. 15, § 15-2-22 (1975).
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luted waters of the Cuyahoga River flow past on one side and in-
dustrial buildings and parking lots flank it on the other.50
Pyke might have added that the air not infrequently
smelled foul; historic preservation in such circumstances high-
lights the larger need for environmental and land use controls.
Historic sites do not exist in a vacuum.
While it may be premature to characterize historic preserva-
tion law, the Pyke observation graphically illustrates that
landmark controls cannot be examined in isolation. The sur-
rounding circumstances unavoidably limit the effectiveness of
any landmark designation. Historic districts are only slightly less
vulnerable. For these reasons, when the Supreme Court in its
Penn Central1 ruling confirmed the constitutionality of this as-
pect of police power regulation, it appears to have distinguished
municipal historic preservation ordinances as a distinct sort of
land use control, possibly within the broader construct of Envi-
ronmental Law generally, but evidently not a part of zoning.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan observed that
"this Court has recognized, in a number of settings, that states
and cities may enact land use restrictions or controls to enhance
the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aes-
thetic features of the city."52 The Court recognized that there
are two aspects to these regulations of private lands: "[B]oth
historic district legislation and zoning laws regulate all proper-
ties within given physical communities whereas landmark laws
apply only to selected parcels."5 8
The application of these controls to private property has a
varied impact from parcel to parcel depending upon the historic
asset being protected; the objectives of the laws and the methods
of application apply uniformly to all parcels:
It is of course true that the Landmark Law has a more severe
impact on some landowners than on others, but that in itself does
not mean that the law effects a "taking." Legislation designed to
promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than
others .... [brickyard, cedar tree-apple blight, gravel and sand
50. J.S. PYKE, LANDMARK PRESERVATION, supra note 46, at 24.
51. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 132.
[Vol. 1:511
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mine restrictions reviewed]. Similarly, zoning laws often impact
more severely on some property owners than others but have not
been held to be invalid on that account.'
While structuring land uses and employing "districts," his-
toric preservation law is essentially a police power regulation of
its own character, not a part of another field, such as zoning. For
instance, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Penn Central ma-
jority, observed that a landmark law "is no more an appropria-
tion of property by government for its own uses than is a zoning
law, prohibiting, for 'aesthetic' reasons, two or more adult thea-
tres within a specified area. . . ."5 On the other hand, Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in the Penn Central dissent, observed that
"[o]nly in the most superficial sense of the word can this case be
said to involve zoning," citing the New York Court of Appeals
ruling below which observed inter alia that "this is not a zoning
case." 5
If not a part of zoning law, historic preservation land use
controls would appear to correspond to other "critical area" land
use regulations, for instance, those controlling coastal, wetland,
or wildlife areas.5 7 The origins of contemporary historic preser-
vation law are rooted in two concerns which make these areas
"critical" and justify regulation. The Supreme Court summar-
zied these in the Penn Central ruling as follows:
The first is recognition that, in recent years, large numbers of his-
toric structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed with-
out adequate consideration of either the values represented
therein or the possibility of preserving the destroyed properties
for use in economically productive ways. The second is a widely
shared belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or ar-
chitectural significance enhance the quality of life for all. Not
only do these buildings and their workmanship represent the les-
sons of the past and embody precious features of our heritage,
they serve as examples of.quality for today. "[H]istoric conserva-
tion is but one aspect of the much larger problem, basically an
environmental one, of enhancing - or perhaps developing for the
54. Id. at 133-34.
55. Id. at 135.
56. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 76-84
(1976).
1981]
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first time - the quality of life for people."58
The quotation used by the Court was one by Professor Rob-
ert Stipe, cited in an early law review symposium on Historic
Preservation Law. In another law review symposium a decade
later, Professor Stipe more fully stated his reasons why land use
controls for historic preservation should be viewed as part of a
broader set of environmental controls. He observed that:
it is quite wrong to draw the preservation movement into a nar-
row corner and argue that preservation stops with ancient build-
ings having proper historical credentials. The historical and archi-
tectural traditions of Nantucket Island cannot be separated from
the fragile natural landscape setting of that place, nor the unique
quality of light or atmosphere that are integral parts of its set-
ting. Similarly, it is no less important to preserve the quiet cul-
tural landscape of Sandy Mush in Buncombe County historically
or architecturally undistinguished though it may be. As we have
seen, the traditional associative values of architecture and history
are not enough if human purposes are to be served, and it seems
more important than ever that those concerned with these tradi-
tional values should now make common cause with other facets of
the environmental movement.60
While there are some who would deny the relationship be-
tween historic preservation and environmental law,6' the two
topics are most usefully viewed as part of the same field. In both
fields, land use controls operate without regard for pre-existing
zoning requirements and there is great similarity in "critical
area" and environmental management objectives.'
58. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 108.
59. Gilbert, supra note 2 at 312 n.2, quoting Address by Robert Stipe, supra note 2
at 6-7.
60. Stipe, A Decade of Preservation and Preservation Law, 11 N.C. CENT. L. J. 214,
231 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Beckwith, Preservation Law 1976-1980: Faction, Property and Ideol-
ogy, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 276, 304-6 (1980).
62. State land use programs designate as "critical," areas such as wetlands or wild
and scenic rivers, see, e.g., N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW, §§ 15-2701 to 2723 (McKinney
Supp. 1981). These designations are distinct from any existing zoning or local compre-
hensive land use plan. The designation of historic sites, also made without regard to pre-
existing zoning, is analogous. These "critical area" controls have been promoted by the
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 7-201 (Official Draft 1975), and are
a part of public land planning, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976), and of state coastal zone plan-
ning under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (b) (1976); see 15 C.F.R.
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II. What is Historic?
Local enthusiasm for developing municipal landmarks pres-
ervation programs has tended to pass too quickly over the ques-
tion of what such laws protect. What is historic? How can "his-
toric" characteristics be defined with sufficient clarity to be a
police power regulation? The substantive definition of "historic"
differs widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. While logically
the procedures employed to determine which of those traditions
require the protection of law should be largely the same, in actu-
ality they can vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
There is no single answer to the threshold question: what is
historic? Since the subjects of historic preservation laws vary
with the location and the history of each -area, if one is to deter-
mine whether a property is historic, one must look at the stand-
ards which the local legislature has adopted. These standards
identify the specific architectural, historic or other interests
which are traditional or of cultural and social importance to the
development of the region of the jurisdiction. Some include pre-
historic or archaeological resources as well, although the impor-
tance of this aspect is still evolving. Having identified these
tests, the procedures for burdens of proof and decisionmaking
determine how the tests will be applied to the given property.
Only when the process is concluded will it be known whether the
parcel is "historic" in terms of the local preservation ordinance.
At the federal level, the National Historic Preservation Act
of 19660' authorized establishment of the National Register of
Historic Places." The National Register is a list of districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American
history, architecture, archaeology or history. Data descriptive of
each historic place is compiled and, if sufficiently documented,
the historic site is placed on the National Register by the
Keeper of the National Register, an official in the Department
§ 923.41 (1981).
The similarity of management objectives can be seen by comparing the National
Historic Preservation Act with the National Environmental Preservation Act as the Sec-
ond Circuit has done in W.A.T.C.H. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Waterbury Urban Renewal Agency v. W.A.T.C.H., 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 470a.
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of the Interior. Places need not be of "national" significance in
order to merit listing; sites of state, regional and local signifi-
cance may be included,6 as long as they meet the act's criteria
for what is historic: essentially, being at least 50 years old and of
identifiable historic importance.
The criteria for determining what documentation is needed
for a National Register nomination are broad.6 Under amend-
ments to the National Historic Preservation Act in 1980, owners
of places recommended for listing in the National Register must
be consulted before the listing is made and must concur in the
listing.6
The nomination criteria may be understood only as applied.
It is necessary to examine the actual listings on the National
Register, and the record in support of each such listing, for each
state or locality where the historic landmark is located in order
to perceive the interpretation which the Department of the Inte-
rior gives these criteria. These criteria and the Register were de-
veloped as a planning tool, not a regulatory control." Nonethe-
less, many local ordinances will regulate a property listed on the
National Register.
An attempt to tighten up the federal criteria for Register
nominations in 1980 left a marginally useful set of further guide-
lines. A new Title III was added to the National Historic* Preser-
65. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470b (West Pam. 1981). See H.R. 89-1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§
6, 9 (1966).
66. The criteria for evaluating potential nominations for National Register listing
are as follows:
Those districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and:
a) that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to
the broad patterns of our history; or
b) that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of
construction, or that represent the work of a master builder, or that possess high
artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose
components may lack individual distinction; or
d) that have yielded; or may be likely to yield, information important in prehis-
tory or history.
36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1981).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(1)(B)(6), as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. § 470a(1)(B)(6) (West
Pam. 1981).
68. If the Register is to have regulatory effect, property owners will want to know if
their property can become listed. More explicit definitions probably are required.
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vation Act to provide definitions. 9 Whatever broad guidance the
National Register criteria provide, however, is of limited utility
in defining what is historic under municipal preservation ordi-
nances. Wide variations are possible. Some municipalities place
no age limits on sites. Others, such as New York City, require
that a landmark be over 30 years old.70 The age threshold for the
National Register is 50 years.7 1 In some localities, the entire mu-
nicipality may be an historic districts72 whereas in others the dis-
trict may include only select locations."
Given a sufficiently clear set of criteria, and a full record
demonstrating that established criteria have been met, almost
any site could be classified as "historic." The essence of these
controls is what the legislative authority determines the body,
social and political, requires. Repeated findings by local town
boards and city councils that their local buildings and sites are
patrimony, a legacy to be preserved, is the incremental process
which has created the field of historic preservation law. This cu-
mulative process began even before state enabling laws en-
couraged it, and well before federal laws sought to shape the
trend.
Since perceptions of history differ, there is probably always
going to be some dispute regarding what should be preserved.7 '
69. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470w (West Pam. 1981). As relevant here, these include the
following:
§ 470w(5): "Historic property" or "historic resource" means any prehistoric or
historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for inclu-
sion on the National Register, such term includes artifacts, records, and remains
which are related to such a district, site, building, structure, or object."
§ 470w(10): "Historic conservation district" means an urban area of one or
more neighborhoods and which contains (a) historic properties, (b) buildings hav-
ing similar or related architectural characteristics, (c) cultural cohesiveness, or (d)
any combination of the foregoing."
70. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 207-1.0(m), (n) (Williams 1976).
71. 36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1981).
72. See, e.g., TOWN OF CRESTED BUrTE, COLORADO, TOWN CODE ch. 15, §§ 15-2-3, 15-
2-22 (1975).
73. See, e.g., TARRYTOWN, N.Y., [1978] LocAL LAW 3 §§ II. A. 1 & IV.
74. Disagreement over what to regulate for historic preservation is hardly new. It is
but one aspect of town and country planning, urban redevelopment, and natural resource
management. Historic prespective on this debate can be found in the following essay
from the English magazine, THE STUDIO, published in 1899. In this exchange, accounted
by "The Lay Figure," a critic, a poet, a painter and the lay figure are engaged in
animated discourse.
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That is the nature of the subject being regulated; the normative
"I have been visiting old cities," said the Journalist, "and my heart is filled
with sorrow at the works therein of the new men."
"I presume," remarked the Critic, "that your pocket is filled with the copy
you have made out of their sins."
"To some extent, I admit," replied the Journalist. "We are all tradesmen,
even the most artistic. But in the retirement of one's leisure moments, one may be
permitted for a change to consume a thought, instead of selling it. And what I
wanted to mourn over was the terrible sense of incongruity shown by the present
generation. They never look where they are building. And so the modern iron
girder-framed contract-built erection, with its veneer of terra cotta and brick, and
its bedizenment of glazed tiles and gilt iron, is remorselessly set up side by side
with one of those beautiful old houses that ought as in Belgium be guarded and
watched over by the Government."
"You are right," the Painter remarked; "it is unpardonable: and another
phase of the same disease is to be found in churches, especially those of impor-
tance, such as cathedrals. I mean the modern monument. Only too often is there a
complete absence of sympathy, so to speak, between the memorial to some dead
man of note, and its immediate surroundings. An effigy of glittering white marble
on an altar-tomb of imitation Italian Renaissance work does not rest peacefully
within the sober grey stone walls of an Early English transept. It produces a sense
of cheapness, very often quite undeserved."
"Yet," said the Lay Figure, "there are difficulties. Would you relapse into
mere imitation in order to keep your concords?"
"Or," the Critic remarked with a pleasant smile, "are you going to try to im-
pose a limit of so many years, within which alone shall new buildings be allowed in
a street containing old ones, or new tombs in a church that dates back more than
a generation or so? You are entirely unpractical, and ought to devote yourselves to
writing and painting pictures. Thinking, happily, is not an art."
"Moreover," the Minor Poet added, "these things must be so. Surely the jewel
loses little by the banality of its setting."
"My idea," retorted the Painter, "tended rather in the direction of the banal-
ity, as you call it, of the jewel."
"Well," replied the Minor Poet, "everything must have a beginning. You have
the new springing up side by side with the old until time blends them into
harmony."
"That is very pretty and partly true," the Journalist meditated. "But time
isn't going to worry about the modern jerry-build business premises, except to
clear them out at short notice, when they become obsolete, and set up others like
unto them, only more so."
"You do not think, then," said the Lay Figure, "that we are providing any-
thing but public buildings for the admiration of the antiquarians and consumption
of the Goths of future ages?"
"Hardly anything, I think, in our cities," was the reply. "The detached pri-
vate house of the suburbs is the most characteristic and most successful product
of Victorian architecture. Where these are built - as to them in justice I believe
they generally are - of good material, they will age and weather into very beauti-
ful buildings - of that kind which is likely to be always popular so long as we
retain the domestic qualities of the nation."
"But what is it that you are complaining of?" interjected the Critic. "All this
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judgment in the last analysis must be that of the legislature, a
judgment similar to the prescription of what formal education
society will require of its children. So long as the constitutional
constraints of due process of law are met, the courts will sustain
the effort.
III. The Real Property Law Transaction
However a legislative body may resolve the debate over use
of the police powers to secure public protection of historic
properties, there is also the realm of private property law to be
considered. Common law provisions govern the nature and often
the use of the land and buildings which come to be viewed as
"historic." The nature of the fee, with any easements or cove-
nants, transects the issue of historic preservation regulation; it is
a necessary background dimension for any evaluation of preser-
vation law.
In those jurisdictions where no municipal historic preserva-
tion law exists, or where a property owner wishes to establish
private controls to protect an historic site wholly independent of
governmental action, a range of real property law devices can
effect the preservation of the site. Private preservation measures
also may be sought in order for the property owner to realize a
tax advantage under federal income or state real property tax
laws.
is interesting. I can understand the point of view of the Painter who naturally
objects to new tombs in old cathedrals. But do you want to abolish the old houses
in the new cities, or what?"
"Well, I admit the difficulty," replied the Journalist. "For one thing I would
like to see all old buildings of importance registered by a Government authority as
national monuments. This should make it impossible for any one to knock them
about indiscriminately. I fear the new shops must be suffered sadly. There is no
remedy."
"Yet," meditated the Lay Figure, "there may be hardly the need for it that
you think. When one visits a foreign country for the first time, one is generally
struck by the harmony - a harmony covering all styles and periods which the
architecture of a town displays when viewed as a whole. I have sometimes felt a
suspicion of something of the same sort in our British cities, when returning to
their grateful dinginess after a long absence. We are hardly far enough away from
our age to criticise it; or from our country to tell how it looks. But the old places
must be looked after; and it would be a really valuable institution if we could have
a Society of the Education of Deans and Chapters in Elementary Taste. The
tombs they erect or allow to be erected are driving away all the ghosts."
1981]
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A. Easements
If an owner does not want to completely donate property to
an historic trust or governmental body, the "preservation ease-
ment," or "facade easement" is available. This is akin to the
conservation easement used in the protection of natural areas
and is designed to assure continued preservation of historically
important aspects of the property.7 5 Such an easement is a vol-
untary limitation on a property, enforceable by another party
such as a nonprofit historic society, trust or other institution, or
a governmental body.
A major problem with the easement method is enforceabil-
ity. Easements may be granted as either appurtenant, to the
possessor of another tract of land which will be benefited by the
easement, or in gross, to an individual without regard to whether
he owns land near the property subject to the easement. An
easement in gross, however, is usually extinguished upon trans-
fer of title and therefore can have a limited life. Even if such
easement were to be purchased in the name of a "perpetual"
nonprofit historical society, if the society were ever reorganized,
it is possible that the easement in gross would be terminated.
Appurtenant easements, on the other hand, entail ownership of
real property that will in fact be benefitted by the partial inter-
est in the historically significant nearby parcel.
Recent legislative developments help alleviate such legal
difficulties with the issue of easements. By statute, some states
now authorize the donation of preservation easements to the
state in perpetuity. For instance, Maryland accepts easements
on historic property, thereby ensuring enforcement by the state
as a perpetual entity.7 ' Preservation restrictions, where author-
ized by statute, as in Massachusetts," may be expressed in the
form of an easement and are enforceable whether or not trans-
ferred and whether or not any particular tract of land is benefit-
ted. An example of such an easement has been provided by Jef-
75. Creation of a preservation easement may serve a number of purposes. It restricts
alterations to an interior or to the exterior which do not maintain the historic features. It
can require continued maintenance of these historic features.
76. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(e) (1981).
77. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981).
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frey Jahns of Chicago, Illinois." The enabling laws of Illinois
make such easements possible 9 and provide for special tax
treatment.'*
Whether such an easement is entitled to an exemption from
real property taxes is an issue of state law.81 Federal income tax
provisions allowing a charitable contribution for donations of an
easement require that the donation be made in perpetuity.82 The
donation must be to a nonprofit organization or governmental
agency.83 The Internal Revenue Code recognizes among the pur-
poses for such easements, "conservation purposes," which are
defined as the "preservation of historically important. . . struc-
tures."" When tax benefits are sought, it can be critical to cre-
ate and donate the easement before the property is regulated by
a local historic preservation ordinance. The easement is valued
for federal tax purposes at "fair market value."8 5 Once under the
constraints of a local law, the easement may have little to no
determinable market value, 6 and, therefore, no charitable de-
duction may be possible.8 7
B. Covenants and Equitable Servitudes
In addition to preservation easements, a private property
owner may employ covenants and equitable servitudes to facili-
tate historic preservation. Since each state has developed its own
common-law or statutory peculiarities with regard to these doc-
trines, the specific real property law of the state where the his-
toric site is located must be examined. Nonetheless, some obser-
vations on the general patterns are possible.
Covenants and equitable servitudes, as obligations con-
straining an owner's use of land, are usually contained in a deed
78. See J. Jahns, Private Land-Use Controls Useful for Historic Preservation, in
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1980 327, 343-66 (N.A. Robinson ed., PLI, 1980).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 401 (Supp. 1981-82).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2 (Supp. 1981-82).
81. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1; REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421(1)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-81).
82. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (1976).
83. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
84. Id. § 170(f)(3)(C).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1981).
86. Id. § 1.170-1(e).
87. I.R.C. § 165(b) (1976).
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or other recorded instrument. Perpetually enforceable covenants
and most equitable servitudes usually are exacted by a seller of
property at the time of transfer; however, because equitable ser-
vitudes can be secured from a property owner at any time, they
may be more useful than covenants for private historic
preservation.
At common law, covenants are the traditional form of estab-
lishing a private land use control; they require a number of legal
technicalities to be met in order to be enforceable against subse-
quent owners. For the covenant to "run with the land," custom-
arily it must be in writing, must be intended as perpetual when
made, and must either benefit the covenantee or curtail the
rights of the covenantor. In addition, one of the parties to the
covenant must succeed to an interest in the other party's land.
Covenants are usually enforceable only by an action for dam-
ages; this situation renders covenants of limited utility when the
purpose of the covenant is to prevent an owner from radically
altering the face of his property.
Equitable servitudes serve the same purpose as covenants,
but with fewer technicalities, and have the advantage, from the
preservationist's point of view, that they can be enforced by in-
junction. Their enforceability depends mainly upon notice. If a
buyer acquires a property encumbered by an equitable servitude
with notice of its encumbrance, he too becomes bound by the
conditions of that equitable servitude. A court will look for an
expression of intent, made at execution of the servitude, that the
conditions are to run perpetually. The drawback of equitable
servitudes is that they must benefit another tract of land if they
are to be enforceable by anyone but the original promisee.
One use of the equitable servitude to achieve historic pres-
ervation objectives would be the purchase of a servitude from a
neighbor or the exchange of equitable servitudes between two
adjoining landowners. A provocative extension of this idea would
be the exchange of reciprocal promises among a neighborhood of
landowners.8 Reliance on the restrictions by the neighborhood
would satisfy the requirement that the servitude benefit other
88. See Beckwith, Development in the Law of Historic Preservation & A Reflection
on Liberty, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93, 139 (1976); Note, Equitable Servitudes as a
Land Use Planning Tool, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 101, 112-13 (1975).
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land, and the owners could jointly issue a statement of perpetual
intent. The result of this exchange would be to create a de facto
historic district under private control.
Equitable servitudes can also be used in a "revolving fund"
arrangement; an individual or historical society purchases dete-
riorated properties, rehabilitates the structures and restores
their architectural integrity, and then sells the restored proper-
ties at a price reflecting their increased value. Proceeds from the
sales go back to the purchase fund to finance the acquisition of
more properties.89 The resold properties carry equitable servi-
tudes to ensure that the restoration will be maintained.
Statutes providing for preservation restrictions typically
provide that restrictions be expressed either as covenants or as
equitable servitudes; such restrictions pursuant to statutory au-
thority are enforceable despite a lack of compliance with the
common-law technicalities. The Massachusetts statute, for in-
stance, authorizes restrictions in the form of equitable servitudes
even though no parcel of land is benefitted and provides for the
perpetual enforceability of covenants in situations where one
party does not succeed to the interest of the other."
IV. The Operation of Local Preservation Ordinances
Before examining a given municipality's local law for his-
toric preservation, it is necessary to examine that state's ena-
bling legislation. Originally, localities relied upon the delegation
by the state of the municipal police power authority to enact
historic preservation controls; more frequently today, states pro-
vide an express authorization to the locality to enact such a law.
These enabling laws delegate to and define the capacity of polit-
ical subdivision of a state.91
The constitutional authority for such state and municipal
89. Howard, Revolving Funds: In the Vanguard of the Preservation Movement, 11
N.C. CrNT. L.J. 256 (1980).
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West Supp. 1981).
91. The statutes can be brief or lengthy; they can be found in a general authorizing
statute or in a special historic preservation law.
New York State, for instance, now has the short provision of General Municipal Law
§ 96-a, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAWS § 96-a (McKinney 1977), in its general authorizing statute,
and a long provision in Article 14 of the Parks and Recreation Law, N.Y. PARKS & Rac.
LAW § 14.05 (McKinney 1980). Most states do not have both of these alternatives.
1981]
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
ordinances is clear from the ruling in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City.92 The ordinances implement the au-
thority delegated to municipalities in the enabling law. Usually,
a local administrative agency is charged with the responsibility
of enforcing the local law. For instance, one court has described
the Rochester, New York,93 agency's role as follows:
The decision of the Preservation Board involves judgment
and expertise and its determination of what changes may or may
not be undertaken in protected districts is to be judged by famil-
iar standards of reasonableness. What might be an appropriate
improvement in one preservation district may be wholly inappro-
priate in another. If the Board's decision, based upon sufficient
evidence, is consistent with the values which the municipality
sought to preserve in the special district involved, the Board's ac-
tion is not arbitrary or capricious. The governing consideration is
not whether the improvement is beautiful, or tasteful, or even
whether it promotes noise or quiet, but rather whether it pre-
serves or interferes with the preservation of the character and
values of the district in which it is located.9
The National Trust for Historic Preservation has issued a
"model" ordinance 95 based upon innovations used in a number
of cities. Beyond the New York City law,9 advanced ordinances
have been adopted in the District of Columbia,9 7 Cincinnati,98
and St. Louis.9 A wealth of comparative local historic preserva-
tion law exists with which to interpret the provisions of a given
ordinance. There are certain elements which are common to
most local ordinances for historic preservation. 100 In applying
92. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
93. See ROCHESTER, N.Y., LANDMARKS & PRESERVATION CODE, § 115-37(B) (1969).
94. Zartman v. Reisem, 59 A.D.2d 237, 240-41, 399 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509-10 (4th Dep't
1977).
95. See S. Dennis, RECOMMENDED MODEL PROVISIONS FOR A PRESERVATION ORDI-
NANCE WITH ANNOTATIONS (1980).
96. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (Williams Supp. 1980-81).
97. Historic Landmarks and Historic Districts Protection Act of 1978, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-821-5-835 (Supp. 1980).
98. Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinances 189-1980, 190-1980, 191-1980 (June 1980), amend-
ing CINCINNATI, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE § 13; CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 741; CIN-
CINNATI, OHIO, ZONING CODE § 35.
99. ST. Louis, Mo., HERITAGE AND URBAN DESIGN CODE, Ordinance No. 57986; ch. 24
REV. CODE OF CITY OF ST. LOUIS, § 895 (1980).
100. In general, such laws:
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these elements to a given municipality, it may be appropriate to
integrate them with other municipal laws. A building code may
include elements reinforcing historic preservation laws; at a min-
imum, the portions of building codes inconsistent with the his-
toric preservation ordinance should be amended.10' Correlation
(1) Define the particular historic nature of the given community; what decades,
events of history, architectural distinctions, or other objective criteria will define
what is historic.
(2) Constitute a Board, Commission or Agency comprised of persons with experi-
ence or skills appropriate to apply the historic criteria to individual structures or
districts within the given community; such persons might include a leader of a
local historical society, an architect, a realtor, an attorney, an art or history
teacher.
(3) Prepare, as part of a comprehensive plan, an inventory of the historic struc-
tures, sites or districts in the community which should be studied to determine if
they meet the historic criteria.
(4) Compile facts and evaluations for each potential landmark or district.
(5) Provide for the giving of public notice and convening of a public hearing to
designate the landmark or district; direct assembling of the evidence of historicity
and making a record to justify the reasons why the designation is granted or
denied.
(6) Establish some procedure for administrative appeal, either to municipal
Trustees or an appeals board to review the designation decision, before normal
judicial review would be available.
(7) Provide that when designation is made, either the ordinance or administra-
tive decision specifically details the identity of the landmark or the boundaries of
the historic district; notice should be given to owners of record of designated
parcels.
(8) Provide that before a given landmark may be altered, an application for a
certificate of appropriateness is filed with the same municipal board or commis-
sion which made the designation; if the alteration is compatable with historic val-
ues of the site, the certificate may be issued and, if not, it may be denied.
(9) Provide that any demolition of any building over a specified age, e.g., thirty
years old, must first be reviewed by the historic landmarks board or commission to
determine if historic sites not yet designated may be involved or affected; a six
month stay of the municipal building inspector's issuance of a demolition permit
is often available if the building appears worthy of designation.
(10) Impose in some circumstances, an obligation on an owner either of a desig-
nated landmark or of an historic structure within a district, to affirmatively main-
tain the site in order to preserve the historic values from ruination by disrepair; if,
after notice, an owner fails to keep the site in sound condition, the municipality
could cause necessary repairs to be made by contracting to have the work done
and assessing the cost against the owner.
This review synthesizes the patterns illustrated by the ordinances cited in supra
notes 17, 96, 97, 99; see Robinson, Municipal Ordinances for Historic Preservation in
New York State, 53 N.Y.S.B.J. 18 (Jan. 1981).
101. See PRESERVATION & BUILDING CODES, 1974 CONFERENCE ON HISTORIC PRESER-
VATION & BUILDING CODES (National Trust for Historic Preservation, 1975).
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should also be examined between the historic preservation ordi-
nance and such zoning techniques as cluster zoning, planned
unit development and site plan approvals.
Where a community is involved in innovative land use con-
cepts, such as time-phased zoning,102 flood plain zoning, 00 or
pending legislative proposals or coastal zone management with
special provisions for protecting historic sites,' " care should also
be given to correlating the landmark and historic district con-
trols with these other land use techniques. 06 Most innovative of
current land use law developments are the proposals for the
transfer of development rights,'0 e a technique already in use in
New York City. 0 7 This tool removes the real estate market pres-
sures which promote the development of landmark sites by per-
mitting the owner to sell or otherwise transfer whatever rights
for area or bulk development the zoning law allows for the given
landmark site. This development right is then added to expand
the existing zoning limits on development governing another
parcel.
Sufficient experience exists with similar municipal ordi-
nances to generate a number of judicial glosses on municipal
practice. For instance, the possible resort to enacting a quick
"last minute" landmark ordinance on the eve of designation to
thwart a demolition has been criticized in at least one in-
stance.'" The failure to set forth with some precision the stan-
dards or criteria for historicity has caused at least one munici-
102. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (1976); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452(2)(B) (West Supp. 1980); see
Tierny, The National Flood Insurance Program: Explanation and Legal Implications, 8
URB. LAw. 279 (1976).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976); see D. MANDELKER, supra note 57, at 223.
105. For instance, a landmark in a flood plain may be under regulations which
would prohibit its rehabilitation or repair; such anomalies need to be identified and
reconciled.
106. See J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIrr: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS THROUGH TH Cm-
CAGO PLAN (1974).
107. See Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for
Landmarks, Favorable Notice of TDR and a Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Im-
passe, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731 (1979).
108. Texas Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924
(Tex. 1977).
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pality to find its ordinance invalidated;10' on the other hand,
even vague criteria may be sufficient if the community's historic
nature is well known and reasonably distinct.110 Creation of a
thorough record whenever applying general or apparently vague
criteria can permit a court to sustain the landmark designa-
tion.1 Where demolition permits are denied, a clear record with
stated reasons must be provided.1 12
V. The Operation of Federal Historic Preservation Laws
Federal environmental law affecting land use of sites with
historic or archaeologically important resources is comprised of
four principal parts.11 3 First are the laws whose express purposes
are to advance historic preservation. 14 Second are the income
tax laws which encourage, or impede, preservation.'1 5 Third are
a range of laws which constrain the activities of federal agencies
in order to protect historic amenities in the course of other ac-
109. Southern Nat'l Bank v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
110. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13
(1968).
111. Figarsky v. Historic District of Norwich, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976).
112. In re Equitable Funding Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1978, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.,
Kings County Feb. 8, 1978); see also Citizen of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d
402 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
In several jurisdictions, practice aids have appeared to guide practice under relevant
historic preservation laws; the jurisdictions include: California, G. GAMuAGE, P. JONES, &
S. JONES, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGAL HANDBOOK (1975); New York,
Robinson, Municipal Ordinances for Historic Preservation in New York State, 53
N.Y.S.B.J. 18 (Jan. 1981); North Carolina, Morgan, Reaffirmation of Local Initiative:
North Carolina's 1979 Historic Preservation Legislation, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 243 (1980);
and Virginia, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN VIRGINIA (R. Collins, R.
Netherton, R. Pisney eds. 1978). New state level legislation is also emerging. Comprehen-
sive controls have been enacted in New York State through the Historic Preservation
Act of 1980, N.Y. PARKS & REc. LAW §§ 14.01-.09 (McKinney Supp. 1980). A careful
examination of all possibly relevant laws in each jurisdiction of practice is required if one
is to be able to synthesize the laws of the municipality relevant to historic preservation.
113. See generally J. Fowler, supra note 6, at 1468-73; and Hanslin, Federal Frame-
work for Historic Landmark Protection, in HIsToRIc PRESERVATION LAW (N.A. Robinson
ed., PLI, 1979).
114. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amended by 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 470-470w-6 (West Pam. 1981); 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. III 1979);
16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469h (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 469-3(c),
469c-1, 469h (West Supp. 1980).
115. I.R.C. § 191(d) (Supp. III 1979).
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tivity.11 Finally, there is one federal law with direct regulatory
force requiring protection of historic or archaeological sites.11 7
Sites of national historic significance first began to receive
protection in incremental and isolated acts. The acquisition of
the Gettysburg Battlefield was the result of such an act.1 18 This
early approach gave way to a series of legislative enactments
designed to more systematically further national preservation.
The first of these was the Historic Sites Act of 1935.119 In
this act Congress announced "a national policy to preserve for
public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national signif-
icance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United
States. 1 20 The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to de-
cide which sites were of "national historical significance" and to
acquire such sites subject to receiving an appropriation from
Congress to do so. 121
The Secretary has inaugurated a "National Historic
Landmark" program to identify sites under the Historic Sites
Act. 1 22 Other programs for data preservation have also been ini-
tiated. 123 No regulations have been issued under this authority,
although sites have been designated and a few acquired.
The broad delegation of powers to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior has been sustained in litigation. 2" Questions regarding the
Secretary's authority and procedures in designating the Historic
Green Springs National Historic District resulted in a federal
district court's setting aside the designation in 1980.125 Congress
legislatively reinstated the designation and reaffirmed the Secre-
tary's authority later that year.2 6
116. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
117. Surface Mining and Control Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
118. Act of Congress, March 3, 1893, ch. 208; 27 Stat. 572, 599; see United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
119. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
120. Id. § 461.
121. Id. § 462(d).
122. Id. § 462(b).
123. Id. § 462(a).
124. Barnidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939).
125. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980).
126. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470a(a)(1)(A) (West Pam. 1981); see S. REP. No. 96-943 to ac-
company S. 3116, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), which says:
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The Historic Sites Act is a reservoir of authority, mostly un-
used. By designating sites, the Secretary not only moves toward
acquisition, but obliges other agencies to act under other laws to
protect the site." 7
More expansive federal authority for national historic pres-
ervation was enacted three decades later by way of The National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended.128 This act insti-
tuted the National Register of Historic Places, the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, and the National Historic
Preservation Fund for awarding grants for historic preservation
purposes. These elements are to encourage the protection of his-
toric property and to assure that federal agencies do not unnec-
essarily harm such property. These provisions are not binding on
property which is not under federal ownership.
The National Register is designed as a planning inventory.
Its regulations govern only the listing procedures,12' and not the
consequences of listing under a local preservation ordinance or
another law. Because these consequences can be substantial, the
Register's planning function has become somewhat compromised
when Register listings bring regulatory consequences as munici-
The purpose of this subsection is to also assure the continued validity of all Na-
tional Historic Landmarks designated by the Secretary prior to the effective date
of the legislation by the Congress declaring such landmarks, whether individual or
districts, as National Historic Landmarks for the purposes of this legislation, the
Historic Sites Act of 1935, and other applicable laws. The Federal Register of Feb-
ruary 6, 1979, contains a listing of all such landmarks designated to that date as
part of the National Register of Historic Places list. The Congressional declaration
of National Historic Landmark status is effective as of the date each property was
originally listed in the Federal Register as a National Historic Landmark. Recent
legal challenges to the National Historic Landmark program have suggested that
landmarks have been designated by the Secretary by inadequate procedures and
beyond the scope of the Historic Sites Act. The definition of historic values con-
tained in the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, is equally
applicable to the historic values sought to be preserved by the Historic Sites Act
of 1935, except for the latter's requirement of national historical significance. By
declaring these properties as National Historic Landmarks, the Committee recog-
nizes the Secretary's continuing authority to determine that properties have lost
the historic qualities for which they were designated as National Historic
Landmarks, and, accordingly, to remove such designation.
Id.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 470; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6. For discussion of the designation criteria to be ap-
plied, see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
129. 36 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-.17, 63.1-.6 (1981).
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palities automatically regulate National Register sites under
their local historic preservation ordinance.130 For this reason, the
1980 amendments to the act made it a condition of a listing that
the owner concur in the nomination. " The Register has been
recognized in judicial decisions 3 2 and is an established force in
its own right, influencing land use decisions.
The Register as a collection of data is used by the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, which was created under the
National Historic Preservation Act. The Council includes 19
persons: The Secretary of the Interior, Architect of the Capitol,
Secretary of Agriculture, heads of four other agencies designated
by the President, one Governor, one Mayor, the President of the
National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, the
Chairman of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, four
preservation experts and three members of the public."'
Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act, the head of any federal agency with "direct or indirect" au-
thority over a proposed federal or federally-assisted "undertak-
ing" or having licensing or permit authority shall take into ac-
count the effect on "any district, site, building, structure, or
object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National
Register," and "shall afford the Advisory Council. . . a reasona-
ble opportunity to comment" on the undertaking.84
This comment process is elaborate and is designed to en-
130. See, e.g., TARRYTOWN, N.Y., [1978] LocAL LAW 3 § II. A. 2. "Historic Landmark:
A building, structure, or parcel of land . . . which has been duly included on the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places maintained by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.
Id.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b):
The secretary shall promulgate regulations that before any property or district
may be included on the National Register or be designated as a National Historic
Landmark, the owner or owners of such property, or a majority of the owners of
the properties within the district in the case of an historic district, shall be given
the opportunity . . . to concur in, or object to, the nomination. . . . If the owner
• . . objects to such inclusion or designation, such property shall not be included
on the National Register or designated as a National Historic Landmark until
such objection is withdrawn.
132. Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999
(1976).
133. The Advisory Council was reduced from 29 to 19 by section 301(a) of the 1980
Amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 470i (West Pam.
1981).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
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courage voluntary mitigation of any adverse effects an undertak-
ing may have on an historic site. The Advisory Council has de-
tailed regulations structuring this "§ 106 Process." 35 These
regulations are binding on all federal agencies.' 6 The regula-
tions superseded in many respects an Executive Order on "The
Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment" is-
sued in 1971. While the "§ 106 Process" has been involved in
numerous court tests," 8 it received its most expansive and com-
pelling construction in the Second Circuit decision of
W.A.T.C.H. v. Harris."' As long as any agency discretion over
an undertaking can be found, section 106 review is required.
Under the 1980 Amendments to the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act, each federal agency is to establish a position for an
Agency Historic Preservation Officer. Costs for agency activities
to preserve historic amenities can be included in project budgets
or passed on to parties receiving federal permits.14 0
A separate further dimension of the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act of 1966 is the congressional creation of the National
Historic Preservation Fund, which serves three purposes. First,
grants are made to the states to assist in preparing comprehen-
sive statewide historic surveys and plans."" Second, grants are
made to the states for "projects" to acquire or develop historic
sites. 4 2 Finally, the fund makes matching grants to the National
Trust for Historic Preservation. "
These grants were administered for the Secretary by the
Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service (HCRS) in the
Department of the Interior. The HCRS was abolished and these
functions were transferred to the National Park Service in
135. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-.15 (1981).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 470s.
137. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1971-75 Comp.) reprinted in 16 U.S.C.
app. § 470 (1976).
138. See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130
(4th Cir. 1971); Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Ely v. Velde, 356 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1973).
139. W.A.T.C.H. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Waterbury
Urban Renewal Agency v. W.A.T.C.H., 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
140. See supra note 126.
141. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1).
142. Id. § 470a(a)(2).
143. Id. § 470a(a)(3).
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1981.144 While no regulations currently exist, the Service has a
grants manual describing how the fund is administered. Grants
are made to the states based upon an allocation formula. Each
state, in turn, decides which projects receive funding. Project
grants are available for the improvement of privately-owned
property. Although authorized at $150 million per year, appro-
priated funds have ranged from $60 and $55 million in fiscal
years 1979 and 1980, to $32.5 million in 1981. President Reagan
recommended funding in fiscal year 1982 of $5 million.145
The 1980 Amendments to the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act also did much to strengthen the role of the State His-
toric Preservation Officer (SHPO) and to promote the enact-
ment of municipal historic preservation ordinances. The
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to develop regulations for
state programs, including assistance to local governments and
private organizations. States must submit programs to the Sec-
retary for approval. Each state program must (a) designate a
SHPO, (b) provide for a State Review Board, and (c) provide for
public participation, in particular for National Register nomina-
tions. These plans are to be reviewed every four years.146
The State Historic Preservation Officer is assigned specific
duties by the 1980 Amendments to the National Historic Preser-
vation Act. 147 As part of his duties, the SHPO in each state ad-
144. Order by Secretary of the Interior James Watt, Feb. 19, 1981, reported in XXI
PRESENTATION NEws at 1, col. 1 (March 1981).
145. The 1980 Amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act, see supra
note 13, authorized a further program of direct grants for threatened landmarks, demon-
stration and training projects and assistance to properties within historic districts. 16
U.S.C.A. § 470a(d)(3)(A) (West Pam. 1981). A loan program is also authorized. Id. §
470a(d)(3)(B).
146. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470a(b)(2) (West Pam. 1981).
147. Id. § 470a(b)(3) provides:
(A) direct and conduct a comprehensive statewide survey of historic properties
and maintain inventories of these properties in cooperation with local govern-
ments and private organizations and individuals;
(B) identify and nominate eligible properties to the National Register and other-
wise administer applications for listing historic properties in or removing them
from the National Register;
(C) prepare and implement a comprehensive statewide historic preservation
plan;
(D) administer the State program of Federal assistance for historic preservation
within the State;
(E) advise and assist, as appropriate, Federal agencies and local governments in
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ministers the grants under the National Historic Preservation
Fund.148 The 1980 amendments provide for a 50 percent match-
ing of federal funds by each state for projects or programs and
70 percent federal to 30 percent state matching funds for contin-
uation of survey and inventory activities.
The SHPO also plays an important role in assisting local
governments to have their ordinances certified by the Secretary
of the Interior. The SHPO and Secretary may certify a local or-
dinance under NHPA to enable properties regulated by the ordi-
nance to qualify for federal income tax incentives and to qualify
for federal aid, if the ordinance meets certain requirements.1 49
Until a state-approved program exists, the Secretary may
certify local ordinances directly. A local government eligible for
certification, but not yet certified, may receive grants from the
fund.150 Once a locality has been certified, the SHPO must re-
evaluate certification annually, and confirm certification every
three years. A second certification process for local ordinances
serves the rehabilitation of historic sites under the Internal Rev-
enue Code. "Rehab" projects must be approved by a tax certifi-
cation unit in the National Park Service; the projects must deal
carrying out their historic preservation responsibilities;
(F) cooperate with the Secretary, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
and other Federal, State, and local agencies, and organizations and individuals to
ensure that historic properties are taken into consideration at all levels of plan-
ning and development;
(G) provide public information, education, and training and technical assistance
relating to the Federal and State Historic Preservation Programs; and
(H) cooperate with local governments in the development of local historic pres-
ervation programs and assist local governments in becoming certified ....
Id.
148. Id. § 470a(a)(2).
149. Id. § 470a(c). These requirements are:
(A) enforces appropriate State or local legislation for the designation and
protection of historic properties;
(B) has established an adequate and qualified historic preservation commis-
sion by State or local legislation;
(C) maintains a system for the survey and inventory of historic properties
that further the purposes of subsection (B);
(D) provides for adequate public participation in the local historic preserva-
tion program, including the process of recommending properties for nomination to
the National Register; and
(E) satisfactorily performs the responsibilities delegated to it under this act.
Id.
150. Id. § 470a.
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with sites on the National Register or designated under certified
local ordinances." 1 Both these certification processes have the
indirect effect of promoting uniformity among different munici-
pal ordinances in the various states.
Properties designated as historic landmarks or buildings lo-
cated within historic districts may be subject to federal income
tax incentives and disincentives. 152 Tax consequences result
from any one of three circumstances: (1) from listing the
landmark on the National Register of Historic Places'" or (2)
from the property's being situated within an historic district
which is on the National Register,'5 or (3) from the property's
being a designated local landmark or a site within a designated
historic district under a certified municipal ordinance. 5 5 Such
buildings become known as "certified historic structures. '"5 For
rehabilitation of these structures prior to December 31, 1981, ac-
celerated depreciation 157 and a five year amortization " of ex-
penses can be used if the rehabilitation has been approved in
advance by the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service in
the Interior Department.' " A further incentive available to such
properties is an investment credit for some certified rehabilita-
tion.'80 Aided by the Revenue Act of 1978,161 this position allows
a 10 percent investment tax credit. After December 31, 1981,
any new work begun on an approved rehabilitation will be eligi-
ble for up to a 25 percent investment tax credit, however, the
60-month amortization and accelerated depreciation will no
longer be available.1
62
151. 36 C.F.R. § 67.6 (1981).
152. See TAX INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION (G. Andrews ed. 1980); Tiedt,
Jandl, Oldham & Gilmore, Historic Preservation Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW supra note 5.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 470a.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part IV at 531 of this article.
156. I.R.C. § 191(d) (Supp. III 1979).
157. Id. § 167(o).
158. Id. § 191.
159. See generally Roddenvig & Young, Neighborhood Revitalization & Historic
Preservation Incentives of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 11 URBAN LAW. 35 (Jan. 1979).
160. I.R.C. § 191(d)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
161. I.R.C. §§ 48(a)(1)(E), 48(g) (Supp. III 1979).
162. See The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 212(a)(2), 95
Stat. 183 (1981) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(F)).
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Equally as critical as these incentives is the key disincen-
tive. " No property owner can demolish any of these categories
of property without incurring a substantial tax penalty. Even an
unhistoric building within an historic district cannot be altered,
demolished, or removed unless the owner obtains a ruling from
the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service in the Interior
Department to remove the certification of the building. '"
Whenever a property in whole or in part is constructed, re-
constructed, or used on a site where a certified historic structure
was located on or after June 30, 1976, that property is automati-
cally denied both the tax benefits of treating demolition costs as
a business expense deduction 6 and accelerated depreciation for
new buildings which may be constructed on the site.1"
In addition to these grants, tax incentives, and technical ad-
vice, and independent of the consultation process which all fed-
eral agencies must undertake with the Advisory Council on His-
toric Preservation under section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act, 167 the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)'" requires that historic values be included in the envi-
ronmental impact assessment process of section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA.16  The W.A.T.C.H. v. Harris 70 ruling essentially con-
cluded that NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act
both require careful consideration of historic amenities by fed-
eral agencies.
As part of a NEPA review, an analysis of historic sites is
required.17 1 Some agencies may decide to merge the section 106
review and the NEPA review in their own regulations, but this
has yet to be done.17 2 Some decisions, such as W.A.T.C.H. v.
163. These tax provisions extended through December 31, 1983. They were enacted
with the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1916 (1976), due to expire
in 1981. I.R.C. § 191 (1976). The extension is a limited one, and revisions in the law are
likely. The regulations for these tax provisions appear in 36 C.F.R. § 1208 (1980) (Dep't
of Interior) and 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-1 to -3 (1981) (Dep't of Treasury).
164. I.R.C. § 167(n)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. III 1979).
165. Id. § 280B.
166. Id. § 167(n)(1).
167. See supra cases cited in note 138.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
169. Id. § 4332.
170. 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1979).
171. See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
172. For NEPA regulations, see Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1978); 40
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Harris,173 require full environmental review of historic sites in
compliance with NEPA,17 4 while others require only substantial
compliance with the intent of the procedures.17 5 Under authority
of NEPA, the NHPA, and the 1906 Antiquities Act, Executive
Order 11593 directs agencies to consider historic amenities in
their decisionmaking and protect those amenities where
possible. 76
Beyond NEPA and NHPA, several additional federal stat-
utes can have importance for historic preservation. The
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1960,'7 as
amended, requires that any federal project or federally-licensed
activity make- financial provisions for the recovery of scientific,
prehistoric, historic and archaeological data which might other-
wise be lost in the course of the project's construction. 7 8 When-
ever a federal agency finds, or is notified of, the possible loss of
historic or archaeological information, that agency must either
request that the Secretary of the Interior recover, preserve or
protect the information, or use part of the project's funds to pro-
tect the information and undertake recovery itself. The act au-
thorizes an agency's spending 1 percent of the project's costs on
the recovery.
Thus, if an archaeological site is believed to be located in
the path of any federal or federally-permitted project, and the
NEPA or NHPA reviews have not disclosed ways to protect the
site or avert injury to it, those conducting the project must ei-
ther do the archaeological dig or ask the Secretary to do it. A
"Statement of Program Approach" was issued in 1979, urging
C.F.R. §§ 1500-17 (1981), issued in 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978).
173. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
174. See, e.g., Save the Courthouse v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
175. See, e.g., D.C. Federation of Civic Assoc. v. Adams, 571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir.
1978); Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Hawaii 1974).
176. 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), included in the annotations following 16 U.S.C.A. §
470 (West 1974).
177. 16 U.S.C. § 469-469(h) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§
469a-3(c), 469c-1, 469h (West Supp. 1980).
178. This act was supplemented by the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (Supp. III 1979), which protects archaeological resources
over 100 years old located on federal public lands. Regulations for this act were issued in
draft form on January 19, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 19, 1981).
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preservation of historic or archaeological finds in situ. 17 9 The fu-
ture implementation of this program under the administration
of President Reagan is unclear.
Beyond laws expressly governing historic sites, protection is
found in other statutes. Chief among these is section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act. This provision limits the au-
thority of the Department to use any public or private land con-
taining an historic site for a federal highway or for a federally-
assisted highway purpose. Such land may only be interfered
with if (a) there is "no feasible and prudent alternative" to the
use of such land and (b) all possible planning to minimize harm
is undertaken. 18 The efficacy of this provision was proven in liti-
gation to preserve a city park in Memphis, Tennessee. Citizens
To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpel s became an important re-
statement of the section 4(f) limitation.
The only federal law to directly regulate private property is
not one which expressly protects historic values. The Surface
Mining and Control Act of 1977 is unlike the pattern of federal
law which provides constraints on federal actions or incentives
to state, local and private actions, which entails little direct fed-
eral regulation of historic private property.182 This act controls
all coal strip mining operations.
Under the Surface Mining and Control Act, all permit ap-
plications 83 require the applicant to describe and identify
properties eligible or listed on the National Register of Historic
Places.' Any known archaeological resources in the area of the
proposed mining activity must also be identified "based on all
available information. '1 88 Permits may not be issued for mining
on lands which will affect sites eligible for listing or already
listed on the National Register unless the appropriate federal,
179. 44 Fed. Reg. 18117 (March 26, 1979).
180. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
181. 401 U.S. 402 (1976).
182. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979); regulations are at 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-
950.20 (1981).
183. These permit applications include those made to state governments under fed-
erally approved state permit programs, to the federal government for mining on federal
lands, or to the federal government for mining on private or other non-federal lands. See
30 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
184. 30 C.F.R. § 779.12(b) (1981).
185. Id.
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state or local agency with authority over the archaeological or
historic site concurs in issuing the permit.'86
The act also permits any person to seek a declaration that
"historic lands" may be unsuitable for mining. 87 The regula-
tions define "historic lands" as eligible or listed National Regis-
ter sites with cultural or religious significance to American Indi-
ans or religious groups.188 By directly regulating and curbing
mining on private land which may have archaeological or his-
toric values, this act serves as an historic preservation land use
control. As such it stands as the only direct federal regulation of
historic sites on private lands.
VI. Select Unresolved Issues In Preservation Law
Despite the large and growing body of law dealing with his-
toric resources, there are more issues which remain to be re-
solved than are now settled. Many of the presentations in the
symposium following this introductory essay explore these is-
sues. Four sets of issues which are not explored in the sympo-
sium will be briefly noted here:
(1) under state law, some understanding is needed of the extent
to which a municipality may require private maintenance or res-
toration of an historic structure and assess such structures for
real property tax purposes;
(2) at the federal level, the ambiguous countervailing tendencies
of federal preservation laws either to become regulatory or to re-
main as an aid and encouragement to the states need to be
resolved;
(3) under the federal Constitution, the question of whether regu-
lation of or aid to religious institutions controlling historic sites
runs afoul of the First Amendment should be scrutinized; and
(4) at the substantive level, it must be determined whether laws
governing archaeological and prehistoric resources are or should
be their own field or a part of historic preservation law, art law, or
some other kindred subject.
186. Id. § 776.13(b)(3).
187. Id. § 762.11(2).
188. Id. § 762.5.
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A. State and Municipal Regulation
The clearest body of historic preservation law is that of the
municipal ordinances dealing with landmarks and historic dis-
tricts. Notwithstanding adaptations to meet the varied forms of
local enabling legislation, there are great similarities among the
functions of these local laws, as discussed above. ' "
Although the historic preservation community has made
much of the economic advantages of rehabilitating historic
structures "" and has paid substantial attention to the reform of
federal income tax laws to provide financial incentives to save
buildings,"' little attention has been directed to the other
financial consequences of preserving a structure. There are
chiefly two problems encountered: can a municipality require a
landmark owner to maintain or restore a regulated landmark,
and how should an historic building under landmark constraints
be valued for real property tax assessments?
1. Maintenance Requirements
Even if a building has substantial historic value, its owner
may not have the financial resources to maintain the structure.
Churches and not-for-profit entities often have limited incomes
which are dedicated to their religious, educational or eleemosy-
nary purposes. An individual home owner or small business may
not have the motivation or capital to invest in an expensive
restoration.
Municipal ordinances typically require that anything more
than routine repairs or maintenance192 be done pursuant to a
189. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
190. See, e.g., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRESERVING OLD BUILDINGS, PAPERS FROM THE
ECONOMC BENEFITS OF PRESERVING OLD BUILDINGS CONFERENCE, SEATrLE, (1975); Busi-
NESS AND PRESERVATION: A SURVEY OF BUSINESS CONSERVATION OF BUILDINGS AND NEIGH-
BORHOODS (F. Stella ed. 1978); B. Diamonstein, BUILDINGS: REBORN, NEW USES, OLD
PLACES (1978).
191. See TAx INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, (G. Andrews ed. 1980); HEm-
TAGE CONSERVATION AND RECREATION SERVICE, UNTrED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS TO ENCOURAGE REHABILITATION OF HISTORIC BUILDINGS: AN As-
SESMENT OF THEIR EFFECT (1979).
192. See, e.g., definitions of "minor work" and "ordinary repairs and maintenance"
in New York City Landmarks Act, NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 207-
1.0(q) & (r) (Williams 1976).
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"Certificate of Appropriateness" which governs the alteration to
assure that it is consistent with the historic value of the build-
ing. 193 Often the expense of recreating architectural features of a
past period can be substantial, and yet the Certificate of Appro-
priateness is likely to require such costs. Similarly, a landmark
law is likely to prohibit aluminum siding as inappropriate for
wood structures, and thereby require annual painting costs
which otherwise could be avoided.
Whenever such tough choices have become apparent to a
Landmarks Commission, the tendency has been to relax the
standards of appropriateness, to compromise with the property
owner.1 94 This practice colors the rigor of the local law's require-
ments. Rather than compromise the historic preservation objec-
tives of the local law, it would make more sense to recognize that
the affirmative maintenance of regulated structures is costly and
to allow a credit against local real property taxes to cover these
costs. Such a process would necessitate an amendment of the
state's real property tax system to allow it. Precedent exists in
civil law countries such as France for such indirect subsidies of
historic structures. 195
Until the costs are met either through such an indirect sub-
sidy or through direct grants, the municipal landmark con-
straints entail a forced donation by the property owner to the
community of the added costs of maintenance. Where the prop-
erty owner can protect the historic site while making a substan-
tial profit, requiring such donations may be accepted, as in the
case of dedicating park land in a residential subdivision.'" More
frequently, the landmarks authority and developer split the dif-
ference, as was literally the case with the New York Palace Ho-
tel which destroyed about 40 percent of the Villard Houses for a
high rise hotel tower, saving the other 60 percent and securing
193. See, e.g., id., § 207-6.0.
194. This fact is difficult to document without an empirical analysis of actual
Landmark Commission decisions. In my discussions with local Commission members and
staffs, a pattern has recurred suggesting such compromises occur. The actual practice
should be factually researched.
195. See Stipe, 1 PAcE L. REv. 567 (1981).
196. E.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
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zoning bulk incentives as well.'9 7
The more equitable approach, which permits full preserva-
tion and subsidizes the expenses of preservation, is a real prop-
erty tax credit. Only such a system covers the affluent and needy
private property owner. Such a system would not, however,
cover the tax-exempt property owner. For such owners, there are
no real property taxes to pay, and there are therefore no savings.
Some compelled contribution may be required, as suggested by
the teaching of the Sailors' Snug Harbor decision '"8 discussed
by Terence H. Benbow in the following symposium.' 99 Just as all
property owners must adhere to building code requirements for
public safety reasons, whether or not they can afford to do so, so
also may some limited adherence to historic preservation and
aesthetic police power controls be required.
Moreover, the real property tax exemption is a creature of
197. The "Villard Houses" are a set of six brownstones, adjacent to each other and
forming a semi-circle around a courtyard. They are in the style of an Italian Renaissance
palazzo, inspired by the Chancelleria of the Vatican in Rome. The bulk of the buildings
were to be destroyed for development of the Palace Hotel, according to an as-of-right
plan under the City's Zoning Resolution, with a variance. In 1974, the variance applica-
tion for the planned hotel was made by the building's owner, the Archbishopric of New
York, before New York City's Board of Standards and Appeals, its zoning appeals body,
when the New York Landmarks Conservancy intervened calling for preservation of the
landmark and challenging the Board's jurisdiction over the variance application. The
developer withdrew the application, which necessitated shaping a new building plan with
the City's Planning Commission staff, involving Landmarks Commission staff also; the
developer agreed to save the "Gold Room," a gilded two-story music room in the Villard
House, but won concessions to destroy a later wing of that House and most of three
entire houses of the five, leaving only their courtyard facade intact. See Robinson, Urban
Environmental Law: Emergent Citizen's Rights for the Aesthetic, the Spiritual, and the
Spacious, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 467, 474-75 (1976). The architectural aspects of the
Villard Houses and their transformation are related in W. SHOPSIN & M. BRODERICK, THE
VILLARD HOUSES - LIFE STORY OF A LANDMARK 131-139 (1980); this account does not
chronicle the administrative or legal aspects of the compromise and has been criticized
as "a carefully worded political dispatch." Smith, Palace Intrigues, 33 HISTORIC
PRESRERV. 54-58 (March/April 1981). The counsel for the City's Planning Commission,
Norman Marcus, has described the process in Marcus, Villard Preserv'd: Or Zoning for
Landmarks in the Central Business District, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1977).
198. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st
Dep't 1968); see also the application of this decision in Lutheran Church In America v.
City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1944), discussed infra
at note 233 and accompanying text.
199. Benbow & McGuire, Zoning and Police Power Measures for Historic Preserva-
tion: Properties of Nonprofit and Public Benefit Corporations, 1 PACE L. REv. 635
(1981).
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state law. So long as it is provided by the legislature, the non-
profit association's realty is exempt from taxes.200 If the legisla-
ture wishes, it can require taxes for historic preservation pur-
poses and then apply a credit against such taxes when the
otherwise exempt entity uses the funds to meet actual preserva-
tion expenses. Such an amendment would be an adjustment in
the legislature's existing social policy to subsidize certain non-
profit activity in order to add the social goal of historic
preservation.
2. Valuation of Designated Property
Regardless of whether such state real property taxation re-
form is realized, there must also be a better understanding of
the process used by an assessor to fix value on an historic prop-
erty under a landmark or district regulation. This issue is ex-
plored in the following symposium by Commissioner Mary E.
Mann, President of New York City's Tax Commission.201 When-
ever a property is under a valid police power constraint, and,
therefore, cannot be developed to a theoretical "highest and best
use" from a market perspective, that property should not be
taxed as if it were freely developable. The assessors should ex-
amine not just the size, location and zoning of a parcel in order
to come up with comparables for estimating market value. If
market value is to be the test of valuing property for real prop-
erty taxation, the role of historic preservation constraints should
be considered.
Perhaps the market value appraisal test is the wrong basis
for setting real property values for tax purposes. Many states
have begun assessing agricultural lands based on income capital-
ization of the actual capacity of farm land in crop uses. 02 His-
toric sites could be appraised, in whole or in part, based upon
what the community finds of broad social value in the landmark;
such public value would be computed and the value reduced by
200. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
201. Mann, Valuation of Historic Properties, 1 PAcE L. REv. 667 (1981).
202. See generally Keene, A Review of Governmental Policies and Techniques for
Keeping Farmers Farming, 19 NAT. RsouRcEs J. 119 (1979); Robinson, New York Sets
Tax Relief on Farm Lands, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
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that social amount. If a facade is regulated to preserve it, the
legislature could provide that the proportion of the structure so
controlled would be exempt from taxes. The savings could be
used by the property owner to help maintain the facade.
If easements and other private property law encumbrances
are relevant to limiting the market value on a site,2 °5 the historic
preservation constraints ought also to act as a limit.2 4 There
have been instances in which local assessors actually increased
the market value on historic sites after restoration.2 5 Where the
land is in a marginal neighborhood, such reassessment could
force low or middle income families out of historic homes solely
because of the increased real property taxes due. In other loca-
tions, where a true market for historic homes exists, and absent
competing land use demands, an historic site could have a mar-
ket value determined by a special use or special market value
rule.
How a community decides to value property under historic
preservation controls is an unresolved and largely unaddressed
issue. It deserves a high priority in the councils of government
and preservationists alike. No consensus exists on how valuation
should be made. Use of market value comparables, now blind to
the historic preservation constraints, can unwittingly penalize
the owner of an historic structure.
B. Federal Ambivalence
In contrast to the relatively settled patterns of preservation
regulatory law at the local government level, the federal role in
this field is unsettled. There is a policy ambivalence: should the
federal government do no more than assure that federal agencies
protect historic properties, should federal rules shape the sub-
stance of local governments' control of historic sites, or should
the federal government regulate historic properties directly?
To date, most federal historic preservation law has been ad-
jective and has focused on the procedures useful to oblige the
203. See, e.g., People ex rel Poor v. O'Donnell, 139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36 (1st Dep't
1910), afJ'd, 200 N.Y. 518, 93 N.E.1129 (1911).
204. See generally Robinson, Real Property Tax and Assessment Reforms,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
205. E.g., Benefit Street on College Hill in Providence, Rhode Island.
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federal agencies to take historic interests into account rather
than deciding the substantive issue of whether or not to preserve
them. Through the section 106 Advisory Council procedures""
and through the parallel environmental impact assessment pro-
cess,107 agencies are obliged to consider the value of historic sites
whenever the agency's action will affect the sites. The National
Register listed or eligible properties are those identified for
these reviews of the historically important properties. Essen-
tially these procedures are constraints on the decisionmaking of
federal agencies. They can, however, have significant conse-
quences for private land use development 08 or public urban re-
newal programs209 which have in the past proceeded in disregard
of historic factors.
Two federal laws combine to provide more direct controls
over private land for historic preservation. A designation as a
"Natural Historic Landmark" under the Historic Sites Act of
1935,110 essentially allows federal control of private lands. An il-
lustration is the designation of 14,000 acres in Louisa County,
Virginia, as the Historic Green Springs District.2 " This area was
placed on the National Register in 1973; thereafter, a nonprofit
civic group, the Historic Green Springs, Inc., acquired easements
over half the land in the district and proferred them to the Sec-
retary of the Interior. The Secretary at first rejected the ease-
ments, but did designate the site as .a National Historic
Landmark in 1974. On January 24, 1978, following several public
hearings, the Secretary announced he would accept the
easements.212
By combining private property rights to enforceable ease-
ments with a National Register listing2 18 and a National His-
toric Landmark designation, the Secretary is controlling land
use of private lands as certainly as if he had zoning authority.
206. 16 U.S.C. § 470(0.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1-25 (1981).
208. See Save the Courthouse v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
209. See W.A.T.C.H. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310.
210. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
211. The District is described in Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F.
Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Va. 1980).
212. 43 Fed. Reg. 3317-18 (Jan. 24, 1978).
213. National Historic Landmarks are listed on the National Register. 36 C.F.R. §
60.2 (1981).
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Although a federal district court confirmed the Secretary's au-
thority to take title to the easements, it rejected this National
Historic Landmark designation as inadequately justified in the
record.1 Congress legislatively reversed the court's ruling on
this point in the National Historic Preservation Act Amend-
ments of 1980.21'
The Green Springs approach to federal land use control for
historic preservation is an initial step toward a regulatory mode
rather than a procedural mode. This step was administratively
developed over a seven-year period and confirmed by Congress.
The controls imposed limit the interests of two mining compa-
nies, Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd., and W.R. Grace Co., to use their
mining rights to mine and process vermiculite in the area. Such
controls were characterized by the court as "intrusive" but "not
confiscatory." 216
A second step toward regulation was a more deliberate deci-
sion, but, unlike Green Springs, one that has yet to be tested.
The Surface Mining and Control Act of 1977217 goes well beyond
the sort of consultation and review authority conferred on the
Secretary by the Mining in the Parks Act.2"' The 1977 Strip
Mine Act requires that those who seek permits for surface min-
ing inventory all National Register listed sites and known
archaeological sites "based on all available information,"219 and
also requires protection for any Register site unless the consents
of federal and local officials are obtained. 20 Moreover, the Secre-
tary of the Interior, or a stage official to whom the Secretary's
authority has been delegated, may classify lands as "Historic
Lands" which are not suitable for mining because of historic,
cultural or religious sites.21
The effect of these provisions can be substantial. Persons
who wish to mine will be obliged to survey the known literature
214. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 470a.
216. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp at 849, citing, inter alia,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
217. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979). See 30 C.F.R. §§ 700-943 (1980). See
also supra notes 182-88 & accompanying text.
218. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1901-12 (1976).
219. 30 C.F.R. § 779.12(b) (1981).
220. Id. § 776.13(b)(3).
221. Id. § 762.11.
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and expertise in archaeology to identify possible resources need-
ing protection. Areas with National Register listed sites, or
those which are important enough to be classified as "Historic
Lands," may not be available for mining at all.
Will these regulatory patterns be repeated in other con-
texts? The announced positions of the Secretary of the Interior
James Watt make it unlikely in the present administration. The
more serious question will be whether in the longer term the
Congress will decide to act more rigorously to protect the na-
tion's historic patrimony. It is in the realm of archaeological pro-
tection that this is apt to arise; the built environment can be
protected effectively by local municipal ordinances. If the regu-
latory mode is not advanced, however, federal historic preserva-
tion law will remain largely a set of procedural requirements
governing administrative agency decisionmaking, together with a
relatively small number of national monuments owned in fee
simple absolute by the United States.
C. Constitutional Law Issues For Religious Landmarks
Although most issues of both procedural and substantive
due process under the U.S. Constitution appear settled,22 there
are a number of possible historic preservation problem areas for
further legal development in constitutional law.223 One area that
raises thorny questions of competing public interests is the rela-
tionship between the First Amendment's guarantee of religious
freedom and prohibition of the establishment of religion,2 4 and
its effect on federal historic preservation programs and also,
222. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
223. Other issues not discussed here include: (1) The availability of an "inverse con-
demnation" remedy, raised but not decided in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), in the open space and parkland context, an issue which can substantially influ-
ence historic preservation regulation if a remedy is to receive recognition by the Supreme
Court. (2) The sufficiency of federal criteria for designating historic resources if a federal
regulatory program is developed. See the discussion in Historic Green Springs, Inc. v.
Bergland, 497 F. Supp. at 851-856. (3) The matter of what kind of hearing is required in
the historic preservation context has not yet been litigated definitely, and as the regula-
tory patterns in local laws grow, designation or dedesgination decisions may raise the
issue. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1976).
224. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-hibit the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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through the Fourteenth Amendment, on those of the states.225
Religious structures represent every historic period and ar-
chitectural style since the 17th century. Indian religious sites are
found throughout North America, many on the public lands of
the United States. Since the colonization of North America, reli-
gious buildings have been built. Many important acts of national
and state history took place inside or in connection with
churches. Unlike residential and commercial buildings which
tend to become obsolete for their intended uses as building de-
signs improve, in most cases, religious uses of specific buildings
remain constant over the years. Many churches and synagogues
have been designated as landmarks under local laws. The desig-
nations were often welcomed by congregations as a sign of recog-
nition and honor; historic commissions often began by designat-
ing old churches, not only because they clearly met landmark
criteria, but also because no change in use or economic loss was
likely in the wake of a designation. It was a "safe" designation
and was often important in terms of local politics.
What is the effect of a designation of a house of worship for
the congregation? The full implications of such designation are
not yet clear. Will a religious society be obliged to maintain and
repair a designated landmark and do so by diverting its funds
from other religious undertakings, as would any other nonprofit
society? Or would such requirements inhibit the free exercise of
religion? Can the state give financial assistance to one religion to
maintain its old church building and deny it to another which
has built a new house of worship? While no definitive judicial
statement addresses these issues, some guideposts do exist. The
pattern of law on this subject is neither uniform nor settled.
At the outset, it is clear that the state may constitutionally
regulate a religious building for valid police power purposes. The
test, stated in Braunfield v. Brown,226 provides that
if the state regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance unless the state may accomplish its purpose
225. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
226. 366 U.S. 599 (1961); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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by means which do not impose such a burden.217
The New York City Landmarks Preservation Act 28 has en-
countered religious sites and problems in their designation in
several instances. The Archbishopric of New York had assem-
bled title to the Villard Houses and, after removing religious
uses from the complex to the Catholic Center near the East
River, ultimately only wished to receive as much income as pos-
sible to fund religious activities. The secular status as landlord
was but one means to the religious end. In leasing the Villard
Houses to the would-be New York Palace Hotel, the Archbish-
opric assisted the developer in' the plans for partial demolition
and reuse. 9
While the Villard contest resulted in a compromise, the Lu-
theran Church did battle with the Landmarks Commission and
won. The Lutheran Church acquired the J.P. Morgan mansion,
an elaborate "Anglo-Italianate" structure, in 1942 to use as ad-
ministrative offices. The Landmarks Commission designated
Morgan House a city landmark in 1965. Once the administrative
needs of the Church outgrew the space, Lutheran leaders pro-
posed to demolish the Morgan House and build a contemporary
office building. The New York City Court of Appeals ulitmately
invalidated the landmark designation, deciding in the negative
the question
whether that part of the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Law which purports to give the Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission the authority to infringe upon the free use of individual
premises remaining in private ownership is a valid use of the
city's police power in cases where an owner for charitable pur-
poses demonstrates hardship, economic or otherwise. 8 0
The court treated the Church like any not-for-profit organiza-
tion, rather than one protected by the First Amendment.23 1 Un-
227. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 607.
228. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 205-207 (Williams 1976 &
Supp. 1981).
229. See discussion supra at note 197.
230. Lutheran Church In America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 123, 316
N.E.2d 305, 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (1974).
231. See the discussion in Comment, Landmarks Preservation and Tax-Exempt Or-
ganizations: A Proposal In Response to Lutheran Church, 1 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 274
(1975).
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like the Villard House, the Morgan House was for a religious
use, albeit for administrative rather than for worshipful
purposes.
The direct question of religious use versus landmark preser-
vation was also presented in the case of the Ethical Culture So-
ciety, which sought to demolish its landmark Meeting House in
order to replace it with an apartment complex built for invest-
ment purposes. The Society asserted that its First Amendment
rights took precedence over the City's Landmark Act.2 2 The
Court of Appeals declined to repeat its Lutheran Church2 3 3 pre-
cedent; it observed that
the Society does not seek simply to replace a religious facility
with a new, larger facility. Instead, using the need to replace as
justification, it seeks the unbridled right to develop its property
as it sees fit. This is impermissible, and the restriction here in-
volved cannot be deemed an abridgement of any First Amend-
ment freedom, particularly when the contemplated use, or a large
part of it, is wholly unrelated to the exercise of religion, except
for the tangential benefit of raising revenue through
development.2 "
The court went on to suggest that if the Society needed to re-
place its Meeting House with a larger one "and is denied permis-
sion," possibly "a claim of First Amendment impairment might
lie.,- 5
Thus, there has not yet been a reported confrontation be-
tween the constraints of a landmark designation and the deci-
sion of a religious society to demolish a landmark structure in
direct furtherance of religious objectives. Quite probably the
preservation of a validly designated landmark will be allowed,
and the religious society obliged to pursue other building plans.
This would be the teaching of Braunfield v. Brown, since the
imposition on the religious society "neither prohibits nor di-
232. In doing so, the Society relied upon Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22
N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
233. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7.
234. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d 112, 122, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246, 253
(1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
235. Id.
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rectly addresses religious observance. '2 23  The rationale is not
unlike that expressed by Judge Jasen of the New York State
Court of Appeals in his dissent from the Lutheran Church
decision:
Perhaps it is time that aesthetics took its place as a zoning end
independently cognizable under the police power for "a high civi-
lization must . .. give full value and support to the . . . great
branches of man's scholarly and cultural activity in order to
achieve a better understanding of the past, a better analysis of
the present, and a better view of the future." . . . Indeed, under
our cases that would be but a moderate and logical extension."'
New York's legislature took such a step in enacting the State's
Historic Preservation Act of 1980.' 8s
One seasoned Constitutional lawyer summed up the current
First Amendment conflicts with historic preservation objectives
as follows:
Thus, it appears that a church cannot raise the First Amendment
as a bar to landmark designation, or even to prevent application
of adequate maintenance and anti-demolition provisions. How-
ever, there may be instances in which a church will claim that a
particular remodeling or perhaps demolition is necessary for the
use of the property for church purposes, and no other solution is
feasible. In such a case the First Amendment issues will receive
careful consideration, and the result is by no means clear .28
The other side of the First Amendment coin is the prohibition
against the establishment of religion. This prohibition may be
violated in the historic preservation context because government
grants for maintenance of historic structures are often sought by
churches. The Solicitor of the Department of the Interior has
ruled that grants from the Historic Preservation Fund ' " may be
made for purposes of renovating historic churches with active
congregations. 41
236. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 607.
237. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d at 134-35 n. 4,
316 N.E.2d at 314 n. 4, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 19 n. 4 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
238. N.Y. PARKS & REc. LAW §§ 14.01-.09 (McKinney 1981).
239. D. Bonderman, Constitutional Issues for Preservation Law, in HISTORIC PRES-
ERVATION LAW 1980, supra note 5 at 39.
240. 16 U.S.C. § 470a.
241. Memorandum from the Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, James
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Under Lemon v. Kurzman,242 the constitutional test for aid
to religion is the following: "First, the statute must have a secu-
lar legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. .... ;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion. '243
There has yet to be a constitutional test of funding for
maintenance of religious buildings to preserve their historic val-
ues. Like providing buses to students attending parochial
schools, 44 providing restoration grants for restoring an historic
facade after a fire could meet the Lemon v. Kurtzman tests. The
Supreme Court has noted the effect such grants might have in
aiding religion indirectly and acknowledged that it is to be al-
lowed just as the indirect burdens on freedom of religion which
the police power may entail must be allowed.2 45
Thus, like all not-for-profit entities, religious societies may
be bound by the duties to preserve a landmark and may receive
the benefits available to do so. Should the duty to preserve not
be economically possible for the religious society, a tough im-
passe is likely. While the First Amendment will probably prevail
as a constitutional mandate over a statutory obligation for pres-
ervation of a landmark, such a tough case may well yield poor
law: This eventuality should be addressed legislatively by way of
anticipation. Special aid for such extreme cases should be pro-
D. Webb, to the Director, Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service, on Historic
Preservation Grants for Renovation of Church Properties (March 6, 1979), reprinted in
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW, supra note 5 at 287-302 (N.A. Robinson ed., PLI, 1979).
This advisory opinion reaffirmed a Solicitor's ruling in 1977 to the same effect).
242. 403 U.S. 602 (1976).
243. Id. at 612-613.
244. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
245. In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-47 (1975), the Court
noted that:
The Court has enforced a scrupulous neutrality of the state, as among religions
and other activities, but a hermetic separation of the two is an impossibility it has
never required. . . .And religious institutions need not be quarantined from pub-
lic benefits that are neutrally available to all. . . .The Court has not been blind
to the fact that in aiding a religious institution to perform a secular task, the State
frees the institution's resources to be put to sectarian ends. If this were impermis-
sible, however, a church could not be protected by police and fire departments, or
have the public sidewalk kept in repair. The Court never has held that religious
activities must be discriminated against in this way.
Id. (citations omitted).
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vided to religious landmarks in order to avert such a predictable
impasse. The secular basis of such aid in furthering the commu-
nity's interest in the landmark must be made clear. Probably the
aid should be available to all such landmarks, secular or
religious.
D. Archaeological Preservation
Although many religious landmarks of the native American
peoples are found throughout the continent, their preservation is
sadly neglected. Construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little
Tennessee River, for instance, would inundate the site of the an-
cient Cherokee towns of Echota and Tennase; Echota was the
sacred capital of the Cherokee nation as early as the 16th cen-
tury. Congress had enacted laws to preserve the snail darter, an
endangered species, 24" but not the sacred sites of the Chero-
kee.247 The preservation of these sacred sites is, arguably, re-
quired to honor the Constitutional mandate not to prohibit the
free exercise of religion. The closest Congress had come to pro-
viding a system to preserve sacred sites was enactment of the
Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960,248 and all that this act did was
require notice to the Secretary of the Interior of dam construc-
tion so that the Secretary could authorize an archaeological sur-
vey of affected areas and initiate salvage operations if the Secre-
tary wished.
This illustration puts in relief one aspect of the issue of
archaeological preservation. Federal law on archaeological re-
sources does not yet embody strong statutory mandates.
Archaeological law does not by itself alone protect archaeological
sites, but only constrains the government to study those sites. As
with the federal historic preservation law generally, 2 4 architec-
tural sites and landmarks can equally likely be destroyed. The
problems inherent in such an unclear policy context, however,
246. Percina mostoma tanasi.
247. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
248. 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469h (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. 51
469a-3(c), 469c-1, 469h (West Supp. 1980). The Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 is also
known as the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1960. See supra note 177
and accompanying text. Pub. L. No. 86-523, 74 Stat. 220 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 469-
469c-1 (West Supp. 1980)).
249. See notes 207-22 and accompanying text supra.
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are compounded by a further uncertainty. Is archaeological pres-
ervation properly a part of historic preservation law or of the
emergent field of art law, or is it sui generis? The status of the
legal protection of archaeological resources is unsettled and
evolving. It is noted here as an unresolved issue in the develop-
ment of historic preservation law.
Because of the importance of the various Indian peoples in
the states, the state governments early enacted a wide range of
laws to protect archaeological resources.2 50 These were of varying
purpose and effectiveness. In the most recent comprehensive re-
vision of historic preservation law by a state, New York included
archaeological heritage within the purview of its Historic Preser-
vation Act,2 51 defining historic preservation to include the study,
designation, protection, restoration, rehabilitation and use of
sites significant to, inter alia, archaeology.2 52
Most other states have yet to address the policy issue of
whether archaeology falls within or without the field of historic
preservation. California has taken the same position as New
York, employing archaeologists within the State Historic Preser-
vation Office. This pattern may well continue.
The federal pattern, however, remains unclear. Since one-
third of the nation's land is public, that is, in the custody of the
federal government, a substantial volume of archaeologically im-
portant resources are found within federal jurisdiction and whol-
ly under government control.
The Antiquities Act of 1906 21 included within its scope ar-
eas of prehistoric value. This has been used to justify federal
protection of archaeological resources.2" The usefulness of this
act in preserving archaeological sites was jeopardized by a deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 55 reversing a
conviction under the act's criminal provisions'5 on the grounds
250. See the compilation in MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (1965).
251. See N.Y. PARKS & REc. LAW §§ 14.01-.09 (McKinney 1981); N.Y. GEN. Mut.
LAW §§ 119aa-119dd (McKinney 1980).
252. N.Y. PARKS & REc. LAW §§ 14.03(4) & 14.03(5) (McKINNEY 1981).
253. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1976).
254. Fish, Federal Policy and Legislation for Archaeological Conservation, 22 Aim.
L. REV. 681, 686-88 (1981).
255. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
256. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976).
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that the act was so vague that it violated due process. The court
observed that the act fails to define "such terms as 'ruin' or
'monument' (whether historic or prehistoric) or 'object of antiq-
uity.' "257 While the Tenth Circuit Court has declined to follow
the construction of the Ninth Circuit,6 8 there is evident need to
clarify the preservation enforcement mechanism.
The National Historic Preservation Act of 196621 provides
scant references to archaeological sites; the act's findings make
no substantial reference to archaeology, including it within the
list of subjects eligible for inclusion on the National Register.260
The regulations specifying the criteria for nominating and in-
cluding sites on the National Register include those that "have
yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in pre-
history or history."2 6 1
When President Richard Nixon issued Executive Order No.
11,593 on "Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Envi-
ronment," 22  there was no explicit mention of protecting
archaeological sites on federally-controlled lands or those af-
fected by federal permits. Only with enactment of the Archaeo-
logical and Historic Preservation Act of 1974268 did Congress
give clear policy direction on archaeological resources. This act,
however, is not fully implemented. It provides that whenever
any federal agency finds out that archaeological and historic re-
sources may be lost, that agency must advise the Secretary of
the Interior. The agency may then ask the Secretary to recover
the archaeological resources or use agency project funds to do so.
The Secretary may also investigate and recover archaeological
resources under his authority.2 4
After five years of little use, the Secretary issued a "State-
ment of Program Approach" in 1979.265 This statement advised
257. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d at 114.
258. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979).
259. 16 U.S.C. § 470.
260. Id. §§ 470, 470a(a)(1).
261. 36 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1981).
262. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1971-75 Comp.), reprinted in 16 U.S.C.
app. § 470 (1976).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 469a-1.
264. Id. § 469a-2.
265. 44 Fed. Reg. 18117 (March 26, 1976), reprinted in HISTORIC PRESERVATION
LAW, supra note 5, at 43-44.
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agencies about the steps to take in implementing their consider-
ation and recovery of prehistoric and archaeological data. No
binding regulations nor any reported use of the act have
appeared.
The most explicit Congressional archaeological policy is set
forth in the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.1"
This act governs archaeological resources on public lands and
Indian lands. It expressly finds that "existing federal laws do not
provide adequate protection to prevent the loss and destruction
of these archaeological resources and sites resulting from uncon-
trolled excavations and pillage. 2 67 No archaeological resource
may be removed from public lands without a permit. Criminal
safeguards are provided, 68 as well as civil penalties.'
While the 1979 act curbs the commercial exploitation of
archaeological digs, the 1974 act has the potential to curb the
inadvertent or uncaring destruction of archaeological sites in the
course of mining, pipeline construction, and other land develop-
ment activity. It remains to be seen whether either act will be
implemented. Will a new energy-related development suspend
activity to allow an archaeological dig? Federal law provides that
it must, but there is little evidence of preparation for this
eventuality.
Equally unclear is the impact this growing body of federal
law will have on state law. The section 106 Advisory Council
process requires State Historic Preservation Officers to consider
archaeological matters.27 0 Some states, such as New York,'7 1 re-
quire state agencies to protect archaeological resources. No ex-
press obligations are set for hiring archaeologists to carry out
these policies. While the use of archaeologists in the preparation
of environmental impact statements has grown,'7 it is not evi-
266. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (Supp. III 1979).
267. Id. § 470aa(a)(3).
268. Id. § 470ee.
269. Id. § 470ff.
270. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4(a)-(b), 800.5 (1981).
271. N.Y. PARKS & REC. LAW § 20.01 (McKinney 1981).
272. When § 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(c) (1976), requires a decision as to whether or not to prepare an EIS, it is neces-
sary to consider "the degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites,
highways, structures or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of
Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural or his-
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dent that local governments or even most state governments
have obtained expert archaeological assistance.
Few municipal landmark or historic district ordinances have
included controls over archaeological sites. St. Louis does pro-
vide that a landmark or district may qualify for designation if it
"has yielded, or is likely to yield, according to the best available
scholarship, archaeological artifacts important in prehistory or
history. 2 73 If the National Register criteria are to influence lo-
cal government in requiring preservation of archaeological re-
sources, a whole further set of financial undertakings will be re-
quired. Can an ordinance require a developer on private land to
undertake an archaeological dig to document and preserve
archaeological resources in connection with a project? Like the
affirmative maintenance issue discussed above, 7 4 this issue is
pregnant with both promise and problems.
A recent symposium of the Law & Arts Section of the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools explored this growing body of
law on archaeological resource protection.17 The introduction to
the printed proceedings of this meeting urged, "It is important
for the archaeological and legal professions to assume a joint
guardianship of our [archaeological] heritage. 2 7 6 It may be that
archaeologists will cultivate their own legal field; the preserva-
tionists of the built environment, stimulated by the National
Trust for Historic Preservation, have done little to promote the
archaeological dimension of historic preservation.
In sum, the test has yet to appear which will propel
archaeological law into its own field or prod it fully into historic
preservation law. Since a separate discipline of experts is re-
quired for archaeology, there are practical implications to this
evolution. Art historians, architects, and local historians hold
the center stage on historic preservation at present.
toric resources." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(8) (1980).
273. ST. Louis, Mo., HERITAGE AND URBAN DESIGN CODE, Ordinance No. 57986, §
896.010(6) reprinted in HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1980, supra note 5 at 239, 243 (N.A.
Robinson ed., PLI, 1980).
274. See supra notes 192-200 & accompanying text.
275. AALS Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, Jan. 3, 1980.
276. Nafziger, Introduction, Symposium: Legal Protection of America's Archaeo-
logical Heritage, 2 ARMz. L. REV. 675, 676 (1980).
[Vol. 1:511
54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss3/2
METES & BOUNDS
VII. Conclusions
There is much more to historic preservation law than the
following Symposium or this introduction can review here. A
wealth of detail has emerged, with discussion and material rang-
ing from the design of an historic district to the administrative
steps needed for a landmark's designation. There are many
more normative issues, such as how urban redevelopment should
treat which historic resources. 8
This symposium is meant to suggest the parameters of His-
toric Preservation Law and to identify some of the variables at
work in shaping those boundaries and the content therein. The
only area which has so changed since the symposium was held
that it was not prudent to include with these printed proceed-
ings was the income tax analysis.279 That presentation by Fred-
erick Goldstein2 80 was printed in the coursebook for the confer-
ence281 and not only have more recent publications have
superseded it,282 but the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
further revises tax incentives for the rehabilitation of historic
structures and renders prior tax analysis largely inapplicable.2 83
The rest of the principal presentations have been tran-
scribed and edited as necessary by the authors and students at
Pace University School of Law and are included here. The
authors provide a wealth of useful insights and guidance for
practitioners of this new field.
With the passing of the bicentennial benchmark, the United
States maturely has concluded that its historic patrimony must
277. See, e.g., the outline and illustrative documents provided by D. Miner, Case
Study: Administrative Procedures of New York City Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1980, supra note 5 at 43.
278. See, e.g., Case Study: Applying Federal Preservation Law Administrative
Agency Procedures for Urban Renewal, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1980 supra note
5 at 417, 581.
279. Goldstein, Federal Tax Aspects, in Panel on Legal Avenues for Preserving Pri-
vate Properties and Districts (Sept. 23, 1978).
280. Member of the Massachusetts bar; partner in Csaplar & Bok, Boston, Mass.
281. HISTORIC PRESERVATION & THE LAW: THE METES AND BouNDs OF A NEW FIELD,
Conference, September 22-23, 1978 (E. Cowan ed. 1978) (privately printed for the con-
ference participants).
282. TAX INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION (G. Andrews ed. 1980).
283. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 1, 101-832, 95 Stat.
183 (1981).
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be conserved. Succeeding generations will view themselves as
stewards of the art, architecture and accomplishments of those
who planned and built the nation. The evidence is in the near
spontaneous flowering of municipal historic preservation laws in
villages, towns and cities in every state.
Once recognized, historic preservation law will not pass. A
new facet of the exercise of society's police powers has been cut,
and its refractive light increasingly is found throughout the body
politic. In another decade, this symposium may look as dated as
the one held ten years ago at Duke University.2 " For the short
term, these authors illuminate the new field as ably and compre-
hensively as is currently possible.
284. Published in 36 LAW & CorTrEMP. PROBS. 311 (1971).
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